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In the life of the law a decade is not a long time. It is, nevertheless, long
enough to justify a survey of developments in a particular field, such as admin-
istrative law. This article will present a survey of the last ten years in adminis-
trative law, focusing upon the cases decided during the period.'
Even a ten-year survey illustrates the rapidly changing nature of adminis-
trative law. Indeed, perhaps the outstanding feature of present-day administra-
tive law is its Heraclitean nature: the subject is one in a continual state of flux.
During recent years we have been in the midst of a virtual administrative law
explosion. In a 1975 article, Judge Friendly asserted, "we have witnessed a
greater expansion of procedural due process in the last five years than in the
entire period since ratification of the Constitution." The same has been true of
other areas covered by administrative law; the entire subject is going through a
period of well-nigh unprecedented change. To one working in administrative
1. For a similar decade survey, see Bernard Schwartz, A Decade ofAdministrative Law: 1942-1951, 51
MICH. L. REv. 775 (1953).
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A DECADE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
law, it truly may be said (with Heraclitus), "The world's a scene of changes,
and to be Constant [in such a field], were inconstan[t]." 3
The cases during the past decade well illustrate this point.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Independence
It is ironic that, though the decade's end saw the demise of the archetype
modem agency,4 just before it began the Supreme Court reaffirmed the consti-
tutional position of the ICC-type independent commission. That position had
been based upon the Humphrey case's' limitation upon Presidential removal
power, which enabled the ICC-type agency to be independent of Presidential
control. For the first time in decades, however, both Humphrey and its position
as the charter for agency independence have been subjected to challenge. Just
before his elevation to Olympus, Justice Scalia asserted, "It has in any event
always been difficult to reconcile Humphrey's Executor's 'headless fourth
branch' with a constitutional text and tradition establishing three branches of
government."6
This Scalia statement was based upon the assumption that "the ratio-
nale.., of Humphrey's Executor requires, that the presidential removal for
cause permitted under the statute upheld there did not include removal because
of the appointee's failure to accept presidential instructions regarding matters of
policy or statutory application delegated to him by Congress."7 This rationale
has, of course, been the foundation for agency independence, since it denies
presidential power to remove agency members for failure to follow White
House instructions.
But Scalia went further and questioned the very concept of agency inde-
pendence underlined by Humphrey as "stamped with some of the political sci-
ence preconceptions characteristic of its era and not of the present day."8 Ac-
cording to Scalia, "It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930s that
there can be such things as genuinely 'independent' regulatory agencies [or]
that it is even theoretically desirable to insulate them from the democratic pro-
cess.
' 9
During the Reagan Presidency, leading members of the administration
carried the Scalia animadversion to its logical extreme. In a widely reported
speech, Attorney General Meese challenged the very foundation of the ICC-type
agency, asserting that its independence from Presidential control was contrary to
3. Abraham Crowley, Inconstancy, in BARTLErr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 266 (15th ed. 1980).
4. See infra notes 802, 804-08 and accompanying text (discussing the abolition of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission).
5. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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the separation of powers. Indeed, according to Meese, the entire system of
independent agencies is of questionable constitutionality. "It should be up to the
President to enforce the law," Meese declared." "Federal agencies performing
executive functions are themselves properly agents of the executive. They are
not 'quasi' this or 'independent' that. In the triparitite scheme of government, a
body with enforcement powers is part of the executive branch of govern-
ment.' 1
Despite the Scalia and Meese doubts, however, the Court went out of its
way in Bowsher v. Synar 2 to confirm the constitutionality of the ICC-type
independent agency. At issue in Bowsher was a statute that was to be carried
out by the Comptroller General - an officer removable not by the President
but by a joint resolution of Congress. The Bowsher decision ruled that Congress
might not vest executive power in an officer subject to its removal power.
During the Bowsher oral argument, the Solicitor General told the Justices
that the proponents of constitutionality of the challenged statute were trying to
"scare" them with the argument that upholding the lower court on the constitu-
tional issue would endanger the independent agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission and the Federal Reserve Board. At this, Justice O'Connor inter-
posed, "They scared me with it.'
3
As I have shown elsewhere," Chief Justice Burger's original Bowsher
draft would have cast doubt on the constitutionality of the independent agencies
because of the limitations on the President's removal power over them. Howev-
er, the Justices refused to accept the draft until the offending passages were
modified. In addition, a footnote was added to the opinion, which specifically
distinguishes the ICC-type agencies from the Comptroller General. According to
it, "Appellants... are wide of the mark in arguing that an affirmance in this
case requires casting doubt on the status of 'independent' agencies because no
issues involving such agencies are presented here."' 5 That is true because "stat-
utes establishing independent agencies typically specify either that the agency
members are removable by the President for specified causes ... or else do not
specify a removal procedure."' 6 There is "no independent agency whose mem-
bers are removable by the Congress for certain causes short of impeachable
offenses, as is the Comptroller General."'7
In a June 6, 1986, letter to Justice Brennan, the Chief Justice referred to
the Bowsher footnote and stated, "I think I've made it clear we are casting no
doubt on the SEC, Frc, EPA, etc."'" The Bowsher footnote was thus intended
10. BERNARD SCHwARrZ, ADMINISTRAnTVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 45 (4th ed. 1994).
11. Id.
12. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
13. Argument Before the Court, 54 U.S.L.W. 3709, 3710 (Apr. 29, 1986).
14. See Bernard Schwartz, An Administrative Law "Might Have Been" - Chief Justice Burger's
Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 221 (1990).
15. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 231.
[Vol. 32:493
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to inter the doctrine of the unconstitutionality of the independent agencies be-
cause they are not subject to the President's unlimited removal power. In a case
the next year, the Ninth Circuit relied directly upon Bowsher in rejecting a
claim that the FTC Act was invalid because it vested executive power in an
agency whose members do not serve at the pleasure of the President. 9
Then the 1988 decision in Morrison v. Olson ° finally put to rest the
Scalia assertion that Humphrey was wrong in holding that Presidential removal
power over the ICC-type independent agencies could be limited. Morrison
upheld the law that restricted the President's power to remove an independent
counsel (appointed to investigate and prosecute high-ranking officials for crimi-
nal violations) to removal for cause. Morrison contains the complete legal an-
swer to the claim that the independent agencies are unconstitutional because
their members are not subject to unlimited Presidential removal power. Under
Morrison, statutes limiting the President's removal power to removal for cause
are clearly valid. Morrison states expressly, "we cannot say that the imposition
of a 'good cause' standard for removal by itself unduly trammels on executive
authority."' There is no doubt about the impact of this statement upon the
independent agencies. With regard to them, Morrison finally confirms the
Humphrey holding that Presidential removal power over the ICC-type agencies
may constitutionally be restricted to removal only for cause.
The President and the APA
As the leading case on its applicability points out, a primary purpose of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was to introduce "uniformity of
procedure and standardization of administrative practice." In accordance with
this purpose Congress defined "agency" in the APA in a broadside manner, as
"each authority of the Government of the United States [other than] Congress
[or] the courts."' The Supreme Court itself has stated "that any exception that
we may find to its applicability would tend to defeat this purpose. 24
Despite this, Franklin v. Massachusetts' held that the President is not an
"agency" within the meaning of the APA, saying, "The President [may not be]
explicitly excluded from the APA's purview, but he is not explicitly included
either." Congressional silence on the matter did not, however, bring the Pres-
ident within the APA definition. "Out of respect for the separation of powers
and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual
silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA."27
19. See FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1987).
20. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
21. Id. at 691.
22. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994).
24. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 41.
25. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
26. Id. at 800.
27. Id. at 800-01.
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Instead, said the Court, "[w]e would require an express statement by Congress
before assuming it intended"' to include the highest officer in the APA defini-
tion.
Whether a federal officer or authority is an "agency" within the APA defi-
nition is more than a matter of semantics.29 Only if it comes within that defini-
tion is the agency action subject to the APA's provisions. If the APA provisions
do not apply to the given action, neither do the APA requirements. Thus, the
Court has ruled that a deportation proceeding is not an adjudication governed
by section 554 of the APA.3 The case arose out of an application for
attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) by an alien who
had prevailed in an INS deportation proceeding. The immigration judge had
awarded attorney's fees under EAJA.3 The Court reversed, holding that EAJA
did not apply to administrative deportation proceedings. By its own terms EAJA
applies only to "adversary adjudication," which it defines as "an adjudication
under section 554 of [the APA]." '32 Although deportation hearings are now
required by statute to be determined on the record after a hearing (i.e., the
normal criterion for section 554 applicability), the Court had ruled that deporta-
tion proceedings are not subject to the APA 3 Even if deportation proceedings
come within the definition for adjudications in section 554(a), they are not
"under section 554" within EAJA because they are not governed by the proce-
dural provisions in the body of section 554.
Similarly, if the action at issue is not by an "agency" within the APA
definition, it may not be challenged under the APA review provisions. The
Court so held in Franklin v. Massachusetts, ruling that since, as seen, the Presi-
dent is not an "agency" within the APA meaning, his actions are not subject to
APA requirements, including its provision for judicial review: the President's
acts, unlike all other executive and administrative acts, are not reviewable for
abuse of discretion under the APA 4 His judicially imposed exemption from
the APA gives the President a unique status of review immunity, not restricted
to review under the APA. Instead, Franklin and a more recent case" lay down
a rule of virtually unlimited Presidential immunity from review, whose implica-
tions will be discussed at a later point. 6
28. Id. at 801.
29. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 971-72 (1995) (holding Amtrak is not
an agency under APA, but is an agency for purplose of First Amendment).
30. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
31. See id. at 131.
32. Id. at 138-39.
33. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955).
34. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
35. See Loving v. United States, 116 S: Ct. 1737 (1996).
36. See infra notes 564-70 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32:493
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Agencies versus Courts
The APA definition of "agency" excludes Congress and the courts Most
modem administrative agencies, of course, exercise both legislative and judicial
powers. It is easy, nevertheless, to distinguish between agency and Congres-
sional action. The dividing line may not be so clear-cut between agencies and
courts. Congress may assign to agencies functions traditionally performed by
judges. Indeed, Justice White has referred to "those Art. I courts that go by the
contemporary name of 'administrative agencies."' 3
The Supreme Court has recognized that administrative proceedings that are
"judicial in nature" should "in proper circumstances command the respect due
court proceedings."39 Hence, the Younger abstention doctrine,' under which a
federal court should not enjoin a pending state judicial proceeding, also applies
to a pending state administrative proceeding, so long as plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity in the course of that proceeding to litigate his constitutional
claim.4'
Similarly, University of Tennessee v. Elliott' held that in federal court
actions under civil rights statutes, the resolution by a state agency, acting in its
adjudicatory capacity, of disputed issues of fact which are properly before it
and which the parties have had adequate opportunity to litigate, has the same
preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the state's courts. In the
Court's view, traditional principles of preclusion should be applied to "the bur-
geoning use of administrative adjudication in the 20th century."'43 Hence, "it is
sound policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to the factf'mding of admin-
istrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity."'
Still, as the Tennessee Supreme Court points out, an agency such as the
Public Service Commission is not a "court";45 the fact that it performs adjudi-
catory functions does not make it something other than an administrative agen-
cy. Thus, in a leading case almost half a century ago, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that an agency vested with adjudicatory authority was not an "infe-
rior court" within the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision.'
However, the legislature does have the power to transform an administra-
tive agency into a court. The outstanding example is the United States Tax
Court. But is that tribunal really a "court" or, despite its change in name, still
only an administrative agency? That was the core issue in Freytag v. Commis-
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994).
38. Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
39. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986).
40. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
41. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 477 U.S. at 628.
42. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
43. Id. at 797.
44. Id.
45. See GBM Communications, Inc. v. United Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 723 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1986).
46. See Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 66 A.2d 726 (NJ. 1949).
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sioner of Internal Revenue.47 The immediate question in Freytag was whether
the autlority granted the Tax Court Chief Judge to appoint special trial judges
to preside over any proceedings was constitutional. It was argued that the dele-
gation to the Chief Judge violated Article II's Appointments Clause, because a
special trial judge is an "Officer" of the United States who must be appointed
in compliance with the clause. The Court agreed that a special trial judge is an
"inferior officer" whose appointment must conform to the Appointments
Clause,' but it held that the appointment by the Chief Judge did not violate
the clause.
Under the Appointments Clause, power to appoint an inferior officer not
appointed by the President may be vested by Congress "in the courts of law, or
in the heads of departments."49 The Commissioner argued that the Tax Court
was a "department" because it had been an agency in the executive branch
before Congress designated it as a "court," and the change in name did not
remove it to a different branch. The Court, however, rejected the view that the
Tax Court was a "department," and said, it "would defy the purpose of the
Appointments Clause, the meaning of the Constitution's text, and the clear
intent of Congress to transform the Tax Court into an Article I legislative
court.
50
If the Tax Court was not a "department," it had to be one of the "courts of
law" to avoid violation of the Appointments Clause. The Court held that the
term "courts of law" in the clause was not limited to Article III courts."' The
opinion emphasized the discretion given Congress to assign the judicial power
to non-Article I tribunals.52 An Article I court, which exercises judicial pow-
er, can be a "court of law" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, and
the Tax Court comes within this principle. Article I courts, such as the Tax
Court, which exercise judicial power and perform exclusively judicial functions,
are thus to be treated as "courts," not agencies.
Justice Scalia disagreed, urging that "the courts of law" in the Appoint-
ments Clause "are Article III courts, and the Tax Court is not one of them."53
In Scalia's view, it is the identity of the officer, not the type of function per-
formed, that tells us whether judicial power is being exercised. 4 Thus, for Jus-
tice Scalia, the Tax Court is not a court of law. Instead, he concluded that
the court's "Chief Judge is the head of a department."" In his view, "'Heads
of Departments' includes the heads of all agencies immediately below the Presi-
47. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
48. Cf Pennsylvania v. United States Dep't of HHS, 80 F.3d 796 (3d Cir. 1996) (HHS Appeals Board
members are "inferior" officers whose appointment by HHS Secretary does not violate Appointments Clause).
49. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 2.
50. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 888.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 889.
53. Id. at 902 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54. See id. at 907-08.
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dent in the organizational structure of the Executive Branch."57 This includes
the Tax Court, since that tribunal, to Scalia, is not a court of law within the
meaning of the Constitution.
The difference between Justice Scalia and the Freytag majority is not a
mere matter of academic theory. On the contrary, it goes to the very essence of
our administrative law. If the Scalia view is correct, it means that all govern-
mental organs other than Article I courts are "departments." If Article I courts
are "departments," a fortiori this is also true of administrative agencies, includ-
ing independent agencies. Justice Scalia himself is frank that this is the conse-
quence of his approach: "It seems to me, the word must reasonably be thought
to include all independent establishments.""
The Scalia Freytag opinion thus reinforced the Justice's position on the
constitutional anomaly of independent agencies. In Freytag, Justice Scalia re-
peated his antipathy toward Humphrey, saying, "I tend to the view that adjust-
ing the remainder of the Constitution to compensate for Humphrey's Executor is
a fruitless endeavor."' 9 Instead, once again, the Justice expressed his censure
of what he calls "the distorting effects of later innovations that this Court has
approved," i.e., in Humphrey and its progeny. To most of us, on the other
hand, Humphrey was correctly decided and remains, under Freytag and other
decisions during the decade, the bastion of the necessary independence of agen-
cies such as the FTC, which can be insulated from political pressures because
they are not subject to direct Presidential control.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Intelligible Principle
It is administrative law clich6 that the Supreme Court has not invalidated a
federal delegation in over sixty years.6 The Court's delegation decisions dur-
ing the past decade confirm its post-1935 jurisprudence. At issue in Mistretta v.
United States'2 were mandatory guidelines by the U.S. Sentencing Commission
to control imposition of sentences in criminal cases. The Court rejected the
contention that Congress had granted the commission excessive legislative dis-
cretion, stating that all that is required for a valid delegation is that Congress
lay down an "intelligible principle" to which the delegate is directed to con-
form.63 As more recently explained, "The intelligible-principle rule seeks to
enforce the understanding that Congress may not delegate the power to make
laws and so may delegate no more than the authority to make policies and rules
57. Id. at 918.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 921.
60. Id. at 922.
61. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
62. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
63. See id. at 372.
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that implement its statutes." At the same time, it is clear that the "intelligible
principle" test permits Congress to delegate power under very broad general
directives. Indeed, since 1935, "[the Court has] upheld, without exception, dele-
gations under standards phrased in sweeping terms."65
According to Mistretta, there is "no doubt that Congress' delegation of
authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to
meet constitutional requirements. ' " Mistretta then shows specifically how the
statute meets the "intelligible principle" requirement. The goals to be pursued
by the commission were set forth, as well as the sentencing "purposes."'67 "In
addition, Congress prescribed the specific tool - the guidelines system - to
be used in regulating sentencing."' The commission was told to develop a
system of "sentencing ranges," and the statute required the maximum for prison
terms not to exceed the minimum by more than a specified amount.69 The'
commission -was also directed to use current average sentences as a "starting
point." Moreover, Congress directed the commission to consider seven specific
factors in formulating offense categories and eleven factors in establishing de-
fendant categories."
In light of the post-1935 cases upholding broad delegations, the decision in
favor of the Sentencing Reform Act is scarcely surprising, nor is a different
result called for by the fact that "significant discretion" was vested in the com-
mission. The delegations upheld by the Court since the Panama and Schechter
cases all suggest that modem delegations may "carry with them the need to
exercise judgment on matters of policy."' Congress is not confined in its grant
"to that method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delega-
tion of discretion." The key factor is the specification of criteria, broad
though they may be, to guide the delegate, not the fact that "significant discre-
tion" is conferred.
Other Federal Cases
Cases in the lower federal courts may, however, interpose a caveat for
those who have thought that the Supreme Court jurisprudence means that "the
principle that the Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative
authority is essentially nugatory. 73 It is true, as a federal court points out,
"that since the New Deal era, in which the relationship between the executive
and legislative branches of our government was dramatically transformed, the
64. Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1750 (1996).
65. Id.
66. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374.
67. See id. at 379.
68. Id. at 374.
69. See id. at 374-75.
70. See id. at 375.
71. Id. at 378.
72. Id. at 379.
73. United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1552 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
[Vol. 32:493
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delegation doctrine has fallen into disfavor."'74 Yet this does not mean that
there is now carte blanche on delegation: "The fact remains, however, that the
delegation doctrine safeguards the integrity of the separation of powers principle
upon which our tripartite system of government was designed, and cannot be
allowed to slip irretrievably into obscurity."75 At least in the lower courts, in
fact, the balance may be starting to shift in favor of the delegation doctrine.
The federal court just quoted struck down a statute giving the Secretary of
State authority to determine an alien's deportability if he "has reasonable
ground to believe" that the alien's presence or activities in the U.S. "would
have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." '76 This, the court
held, was an invalid delegation, since there was no "recognized standard" upon
the Secretary's otherwise "'totally unrestricted freedom of choice."' The "po-
tentially serious" standard was "wholly illusory.... it imposes no floor or
balancing equation to guide the Secretary."'7 It is striking that the court invali-
dated a delegation relating solely to foreign affairs, where, as Justice O'Connor
put it at a recent oral argument, Curtiss-WrighF9 held that "delegation stan-
dards are much more lax."8 According to the district court, however, Curtiss-
Wright does not mean that such a delegation may be completely unlimited.
Indeed, in Curtiss-Wright, the delegation, though broad, was specific "when
compared to the blanket grant of discretion""' in the instant statute.
The Eighth Circuit has also ruled that a federal statute constituted an inval-
id delegation. 2 At issue was the Secretary of the Interior's acquisition of com-
mercial land in trust for an Indian tribe. The relevant statute authorizes the
Secretary "in his discretion, to acquire ... any interest in lands... within or
without existing reservations... for the purpose of providing land for Indi-
ans."83 In the Eighth Circuit's view, this provision was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power because the statute provides no legislative stan-
dards or boundaries governing the Secretary's acquisitions. The Secretary's
argument that the statutory purpose of "providing land for Indians" sufficiently
defines the policy and boundaries of the delegated power was rejected. Even
under the relaxed post-1935 approach, "[a] delegation is overbroad. .. 'if we
could say that there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the
Administrator's action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to
74. Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681, 707 (D.NJ. 1996).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 698 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C)(i) (1994)).
77. Id. at 708-09.
78. Id. at 709.
79. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
80. Petitioner's Oral Argument, 1996 WL 13954, at *17 (Jan. 9, 1996), Loving v. United States, 116 S.
Ct. 1737 (1996) (No. 94-1966).
81. Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 708.
82. See South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996).
83. Id. at 882 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994)).
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ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed."' 84 That, the Eighth
Circuit concluded, was true of the instant delegation:.
By its literal terms, the statute permits the Secretary to purchase a factory,
an office building, a residential subdivision, or a golf course in trust for
an Indian tribe, thereby removing these properties from state and local tax
rolls. Indeed, it would permit the Secretary to purchase the Empire State
Building in trust for a tribal chieftain as a wedding present. There are no
perceptible "boundaries," no "intelligible principles," within the four cor-
ners of the statutory language that constrain this delegated authority
except that the acquisition must be "for Indians."85
In a case such as this, the nondelegation doctrine requires "that Congress, not
the Executive, articulate and configure the underlying public use that justifies
an acquisition."86 Here, there is a "legislative vacuum": "when Congress autho-
rizes the Secretary to acquire land in trust 'for Indians,' it has given the agency
no 'intelligible principle,' no 'boundaries' by which the public use underlying a
particular acquisition may be defined and judicially reviewed."'
State Cases
Federal law is, of course, not the only law on delegation. State courts
continue to take a stricter approach to delegation than the U.S. Supreme Court.
Typical is a 1992 Illinois decision ruling that a delegation of power to issue
certificates of appropriateness of external appearance required for building per-
mits did not contain an adequate standard. 88 The statute provided that the cer-
tificate was to be granted "unless the Commission finds ... that the proposed
building... will be inappropriate to, or incompatible with, the character of the
surrounding neighborhood." '89 This, the court said, used "precisely the sort of
criteria held inadequate."' If anything, however, the standard at issue is more
defined than the "public interest" standard upheld in federal cases.9
There are other state cases that involve out-of-the ordinary delegations. A
Utah decision struck down a statute allowing a public utility to veto an incen-
tive rate regulation plan adopted by the Public Service Commission on the
ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a pri-
vate party.9' Though there has not been a comparable federal case since
1936,' 3 the decision appears correct; to allow the regulated company to decide
whether it is to be bound by the Commission's rate plan is to vest it with the
very regulatory power that should be given to the regulatory agency alone.
84. Id. at 881 (quoting Yakus v. United Staes, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944)).
85. Id. at 882.
86. Id. at 883.
87. Id.
88. See Waterfront Estates Dev., Inc. v. City of Palos Hills, 597 N.E.2d 641, 647 (II. App. Ct. 1992).
89. Id. at 647.
90. Id.
91. See BERNARD ScuvWARiZ, ADMINsmSRATIv LAW § 2.7 (3d ed. 1991).
92. See Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994).
93. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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More questionable is an Oklahoma decision" invalidating the state's Pre-
vailing Wage Act - popularly known as the Little Davis-Bacon Act, since it
was the state counterpart of that federal law which requires the payment of
prevailing wages on federally financed construction projects. The Oklahoma law
also required the prevailing wage in the locality to be paid under state construc-
tion contracts. For purposes of the statute, the prevailing wage already deter-
mined by the U.S. Department of Labor for federally funded projects under the
Davis-Bacon Act was to be adopted. The court ruled that this was an invalid
delegation. First, "the Act has provided no definite standards or articulated
safeguards for the United States Department of Labor to follow in implementing
the legislative policy declared in the Act. The current Act leaves an important
determination to the unrestricted and standardless discretion of unelected bu-
reaucrats.""5 Yet, the Davis-Bacon Act itself provides standards that have never
been questioned, and it is difficult to see why the state should have to provide
its own standards in addition to guide exercise of the power to determine pre-
vailing wages.
According to the court, however, the Oklahoma law suffers from an even
more fundamental delegation defect: "Worse, it delegates to an administrative
arm of the federal government. As a result, the federal agency which actually
determines the prevailing wage is less answerable to the will of the people of
Oklahoma than is the [comparable state offiQial]."' It is hard to see why state
enlistment of aid by a federal agency constitutes an unconstitutional delegation
to that agency. States and nation are complementary parts of a federal system,
not competing nation-states. If what Justice O'Connor terms "cooperative feder-
alism"" permits the federal government to use state officers to carry out its
laws, the same should be true of use of data compiled by federal officers in the
operation of state laws. Would the Oklahoma court strike down the use of fed-
eral cost-of-living data to provide annual adjustments to state employees to
match the rate of inflation?
"Core" Legislative Functions?
In several cases during the decade, the argument was made that there are
certain "core" functions that must be reviewed under a stricter standard when
they are delegated. Thus, in Touby v. United States,98 it was claimed that
something more than an "intelligible principle" was required when Congress
authorized regulations that contemplated criminal sanctions. The contention was
that regulations of this sort posed a heightened risk to individual liberty and
that Congress must therefore provide more specific guidance. The Court did not
94. See City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma ex reL Okla. Dep't of Labor, 918 P.2d 26 (Okla. 1995).
95. Id. at 30.
96. Id.
97. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
98. 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
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resolve the issue, saying, "Our cases are not entirely clear as to whether more
specific guidance is in fact required."'
More recently, however, the Court has affirmed the validity "of a delegated
authority to define crimes."'" According to Loving v. United States, the dele-
gation doctrine does not bar
... Congress' delegation of authority to define criminal punishments. We
have upheld delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency
defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal, so long as Congress
makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punish-
ment, and the regulations "confin[e] themselves within the field covered
by the statute.'' 1°0
The Touby-type argument was specifically rejected in Skinner v. Mid-
America Pipeline Co."° A law directed the Secretary of Transportation to es-
tablish pipeline safety user fees for persons operating hazardous pipelines.
Plaintiffs argued that "the assessment of these pipeline safety user fees must be
scrutinized under a more exacting nondelegation lens" because, though labeled
"user fees," the assessments were actually tax assessments. 3 Skinner rejected
this argument, saying, "[W]e find no support.., for Mid-America's contention
that the text of the Constitution or the practices of Congress require the applica-
tion of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Congress
delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power.""'
Even if the user fees were a form of taxation, the delegation under Congress'
taxing power was subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than that applied
to other delegation challenges.
Hence, as the Court has more recently confirmed, "Congress may delegate
authority under the taxing power."' 5 Yet it may be doubted that the reach of
Skinner is as broad as some of the Court's language. There, the delegation at
issue was a narrow one, authorizing user fees subject to a stated limit that en-
sured they would more or less cover the administrative costs of the regulatory
program-"° This does not mean that any delegation of the taxing power would
be valid if it otherwise met the requirements of the nondelegation doctrine. For
example, it is hard to see how a delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury to
fix income tax rates could be upheld no matter how specific a standard to guide
administrative discretion in the matter was contained in the enabling statute.
99. Id. at 166.
100. Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (1996).
101. Id. (quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911)).
102. 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
103. Id. at 220.
104. Id. at 222-23.
105. Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1748.
106. See Skinner, 490 U.S. at 219-20.
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Loving and Presidential Delegations
Legal rules, unlike those in the physical sciences, do not have fixed areas
of strain and stress; instead, too often, they may be pushed to the breaking
point permitted by expediency. To this observer, the 1996 decision in Loving v.
United States may do just that to the delegation doctrine.
At issue in Loving was the delegation of authority to the President to pre-
scribe aggravating factors that permit a court-martial to impose the death penal-
ty upon a member of the armed forces convicted of murder. Under Furman v.
Georgia, 7 which concededly applied to the military capital punishment
scheme, court-martial members were required to "specifically identify the aggra-
vating factors upon which they have relied in choosing to impose the death
penalty."'' 8 The President had issued an Executive Order providing that, be-
fore a military death sentence may be imposed, at least one aggravating factor
must be present; it then enumerates 11 categories of aggravating factors suffi-
cient for imposition of the death penalty."° The Court held that Congress had
delegated to the President the authority to prescribe the aggravating factors in
military murder cases."' But petitioner claimed that the separation of powers
requires that Congress, not the President, make the "fundamental policy deter-
mination" on the factors that warrant capital punishment."' In effect, this was
repeating the "core functions" argument - that Congress cannot delegate au-
thority to prescribe aggravating factors. Instead, that was a "core" function that
Congress had to perform itself. Only Congress was given the power "To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,"' . and
the determination of aggravating factors governing military capital cases was a
"quintessential policy judgment" for the legislature.
In rejecting this claim, the Court conducted an extensive excursus into the
history of military capital punishment in England."' The excursus, though
learned, was irrelevant." 4 If there was one thing the Framers sought to avoid,
it was to create their Executive in the image of the English King. What is clear,
however, is the Court's reaffirmation of the Skinner holding that there are no
inherently nondelegable functions."5 Skinner so ruled with regard to the tax-
ing power, Loving holds the same for the power to govern the military, includ-
ing rules for capital punishment. "This power," says the Court, "is no less ple-
nary than other Article I powers... and we discern no reasons why Congress
107. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
108. Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1741-42.
109. See id. at 1742.
110. See id. at 1750.
111. See id. at 1742.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 14.
113. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1744-47.
114. This point was stressed in the concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 1752
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. See id. at 1748 (citing Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.. 490 U.S. 212 (1989)).
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should have less capacity to make measured and appropriate delegations of this
power than of any other... 6
Loving pushes the Court's post-1935 abnegation on delegation to the edge.
The Court holds that, despite Mistretta's "intelligible principle" requirement, the
Loving delegation was valid even though Congress provided no principle (intel-
ligible or otherwise) telling the President how to select aggravating factors. In
fact, Loving indicates, no such guidance was needed, given the nature of the
delegation and the officer who is to exercise the delegated authority."2 7 The
implication is that no standard - not even an "intelligible principle" - is
needed for a delegation to the President, particularly when it involves his duties
as Commander in Chief. Indeed, the Court goes so far as to assert, "It is hard to
deem lawless a delegation giving the President broad discretion to prescribe
rules on this subject."' 18
Administrative law heresy perhaps - but it fits in with the dominant
theme of the decade's high Court jurisprudence vis-A-vis Presidential power.
Nondelegable Policy-Making
The argument rejected in Skinner and Loving - that there are "quintessen-
tial policy judgments" that may not be delegated - was accepted in a New
York case."9 The Public Health Council (a state agency authorized to "deal
with any matters affecting the.., public health") issued "regulations prohibit-
ing smoking in a wide variety of indoor areas open to the public, including
schools, hospitals, auditoriums, food markets, stores, banks, taxicabs and limou-
sines.""
The New York court ruled the PHC smoking ban invalid. In the court's
view, "the difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and legis-
lative policy-making has been transgressed."'' In issuing these regulations,
"the PHC has usurped the Legislature's prerogative, all of these circumstances,
when viewed in combination, paint a portrait of an agency that has improperly
assumed for itself '[t]he open-ended discretion to choose ends' . . . which char-
acterizes the elected legislature's role in our system of government."'22
According to the court, "Striking the proper balance among health con-
cerns, cost and privacy interests ... is a uniquely legislative function."'' In
this case, "the agency has built a regulatory scheme on its own conclusions
about the appropriate balance of trade-offs between health and cost."'24 Here,
"it was 'acting solely on [its] own ideas of sound public policy' and was there-
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 1751.
119. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987).
120. Id. at 1352.
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fore operating outside of its proper sphere of authority."'" The delegation to
the agency, broad though it is, "cannot be construed to encompass the policy-
making activity at issue here without running afoul of the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers doctrine."'"
To this writer, the New York court's decision is both sound and consistent
with administrative law principles. It is basic in our system, as then-Justice
Rehnquist stated, "that important choices of policy are made by Congress, the
branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will."'" Thus, a
broad "public interest" delegation to the FPC did not authorize the Commission
to issue a rule prohibiting discriminatory employment practices by regulated
companies." A similar delegation to the FCC did not empower it to require
cable TV operators to allow free access to certain channels by public, educa-
tional, governmental, and leased access users. 29 The decision to eradicate em-
ployment discrimination by power companies, or to impose common-carrier
obligations on cable operators, is, in Rehnquist's phrase, "quintessentially one
of legislative policy."'' Such decisions should be made by the elected rep-
resentatives of the people, not appointed bureaucrats - however well-meaning
their intentions. The same is true of the decision to ban smoking in public plac-
es. It too, involves the type of basic change in public policy that should be
made by the legislator and not an administrative delegate. After all, as Justice
Brennan reminds us, "formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsi-
bility.''
Adjudicatory Authority
It is by now a truism that "not... all adjudication is judicial.' 3' The
power to decide contested cases is an integral part of today's administrative
process;33 at least since Crowell v. Benson,134 it has not been doubted that
the power to decide cases may be delegated to agencies other than courts. In
recent years, however, the Supreme Court has needlessly confused the question
of what adjudicatory authority may be delegated to administrative agencies. In
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 3 Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion revived the public rights-private rights distinction as
the criterion upon which delegations of adjudicatory authority to agencies may
turn. The Brennan opinion permits the administrative exception to the rule of
125. Id. (quoting Matter of Picone v. Commissioner of Licenses, 149 N.E. 336 (N.Y. 1925)).
126. Id. at 1356.
127. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
128. See NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
129. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
130. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U. S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
131. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 66 A.2d 726, 730 (NJ. 1949).
133. See Matter of Carberry, 556 A.2d 314, 319 (NJ. 1989).
134. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
135. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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Article I adjudication only for "decisions involving 'public' as opposed to
'private' rights."'136
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg37 shows that those of us who had con-
cluded that Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Company had
interred the public rights-private rights distinction as the basis of agency adjudi-
catory authority may have been too hasty. In Granfinanciera, Justice Brennan
again relied upon the distinction, this time speaking through an opinion of the
Court.
On its face, Granfinanciera involved only a bankruptcy issue - "whether
a person who has not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate has a right
to a jury trial when sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover an allegedly
fraudulent monetary transfer."'' The Court answered in the affirmative, as-
serting, "Congress may only deny trials by jury in actions at law... in cases
where 'public rights' are litigated."'39 It may consequently assign cases "in-
volving public rights" to agencies free from Seventh Amendment strictures,
"[b]ut it lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private right of
their constitutional right to a trial by jury."'" Conversely, "[u]nless a legal
cause of action involves 'public rights,' Congress may not deprive parties liti-
gating over such a right of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee to a jury tri-
al.'' 1 The same is true of Congressional power to assign the adjudication of a
statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal.
To limit agency adjudicatory authority to cases involving only "public
rights" is, however, to turn back the administrative law clock almost a century.
The distinction between public and private rights was bypassed long ago by
workers' compensation laws. This has been clear ever since Crowell v. Benson;
as Justice O'Connor points out, "the statute in Crowell displaced a traditional
cause of action and affected a pre-existing relationship based on a common-law
contract for hire. Thus, it clearly fell within the range of matters reserved to
Article I courts under the holding of Northern Pipeline."'42
The workers' compensation example shows that the point under discussion
is an intensely practical one. If agencies may be given only the power to adju-
dicate matters of public right, the implication is that the whole host of agencies
vested with adjudicatory authority over cases involving rights between private
parties, starting with workers' compensation, is constitutionally suspect. That
would, as indicated, mean going back almost a century in administrative law
development.
136. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585 (1985).
137. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
138. Id. at 36.
139. Id. at 51. Cf. Crude Co. v. FERC, 923 F. Supp. 222, 234 (D.D.C. 1996) (cases involving public
rights may be adjudicated by agencies without implicating Seventh Amendment).
140. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51-52.
141. Id. at 53.
142. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985).
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One who has had to weave with the Supreme Court from Northern Pipe-
line to Thomas to Granfinanciera is bound to turn with relief to the straightfor-
ward approach of what is now the leading state case on delegation of adjudica-
tory authority. At issue in McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board"
was the power to decide complaints that landlords had charged excess rents in
violation of maximum allowable rents. Respondents claimed that administrative
adjudication of excess rent claims was invalid because it permitted the agency
to exercise judicial powers in violation of the state constitutional provision
confining "judicial powers" to the courts.'"
The California court rejected this claim and upheld the delegation although
the case clearly involved "private" rights between landlord and tenant. The
court did not, however, devote its time to the public rights-private rights dis-
tinction. To the contrary, it expressly rejected a "suggested test incorporating
the high court's 'public rights' doctrine."'" Instead, it stated, "a more tolerant
approach to the delegation of judicial powers has emerged out of a perceived
necessity to accommodate administrative adjudication of certain disputes and
thereby to cope with increasing demands on our traditional judicial system."'"
After describing the holdings of sister states that "such remedial power as
is involved here does not constitute an impermissible exercise of judicial pow-
er,' ' 147 the California court stated what it considered the proper guidelines:
An administrative agency may constitutionally hold hearings, determine
facts, apply the law to those facts, and order relief - including certain
types of monetary relief - so long as (i) such activities are authorized by
statute or legislation and are reasonably necessary to effectuate the admin-
istrative agency's primary, legitimate regulatory purposes, and (ii) the
"essential" judicial power... remains ultimately in the courts, through
review of agency determinations."
The California court's approach, which does not depend at all upon any
public rights-private rights distinction, is to be preferred to the Supreme Court's
indication that the distinction may be crucial in adjudicatory power delegations.
The correct rule is that even in cases of private right there is no requirement
that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of judicial power, all determi-
nations shall be made by judges. There is no constitutional obstacle to employ-
ment of the administrative method that experience has shown essential to deal
with the plethora of cases involved. The review authority of the courts pre-
serves the essentials of their judicial power.
143. 777 P. 2d 91 (Cal. 1989).
144. See id. at 94.
145. Id. at 116.
146. Id. at 102.
147. Id. at 103.
148. Id. at 106 (emphasis omitted).
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Remedies and Sanctions
Adjudicatory authority is more than the power to decide cases. It also
includes the power to grant appropriate remedies. According to a state judge,
nevertheless, a law "which grants an administrative body the power to assess
economic damages constitutes an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial pow-
er.'1 49 Such a view may have had some basis years ago. It has, however, been
bypassed by this century's developing administrative law. Starting with
workers' compensation, agency authority to make money awards has become
increasingly common. Despite the assertion of the state judge, the Supreme
Court has affirmed that delegation to agencies of such authority "itself is of
unquestioned constitutional validity."'50 Typical during the decade was a Mon-
tana case rejecting the claim that a statute allowing an agency to award damag-
es in discrimination cases constituted an unconstitutional delegation.'
It has also been settled, at least since the FTC Act, that agencies may be
vested with the cease-and-desist power - which gives them authority to issue
what are, in effect, administrative "injunctions."'' An Alabama case goes fur-
ther and upholds the exercise by an agency of the power to issue cease-and-
desist orders, even though the legislature had not delegated that authority to the
agency. The court ruled that the agency had implied authority, under a catch-all
statutory grant of power, "to take such measures as will prevent the violation of
any provision" of the agency's enabling act.' Such a decision is administra-
tive law heresy; it is a patent violation of the principle requiring agency authori-
ty to be grounded in an express delegation. The correct approach was stated in
a 1993 federal case, in answer to an agency claim of implied rulemaking au-
thority: "It remains a fundamental principle of administrative law that agencies
may not self-levitate their power to promulgate regulations - they must rather
find any such power in a source conferred by [the legislature].' 54
Court injunctions are, of course, enforced by the contempt power. Since
the Brimson case 5 a century ago, it has been assumed that contempt power is
limited to courts and may not be conferred upon administrative agencies. Ac-
cording to the Court in Brimson, a body such as the ICC, "could not, under our
system of government, and consistently with due process of law, be invested
with" contempt power.'56 This was also the view taken by a Louisiana court,
which held that "[t]he powers of adjudicating and punishing for contempt are
149. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 522 So. 2d 852, 856-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (Nesbitt, J., dissenting). See also United Farm Workers of Am. v. Agricultural Labor Relations
Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding no agency power to award damages).
150. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986).
151. See Vainio v. Brookshire, 852 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1993).
152. See ScHwART, supra note 91, § 2.26.
153. Alabama Sec. Comm'n v. American Bus. Club, 612 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
154. Respect Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1993). See
also In re Advisory Opinion, 627 A.2d 1246 (R.I. 1993) (agency power only from statutes defining powers);
Ross v. Highlands Ins. Co., 590 So. 2d 1177 (Ga. 1991) (no agency inherent power to enforce orders).
155. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
156. Id. at 485.
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essentially judicial in nature.... [A]n administrative agency does not have
power to impose punishment for contempt, unless constitutional provisions
expressly give the agency that power."'
157
The established Brimson rule notwithstanding, two state cases during the
decade uphold agency exercises of contempt power.'58 In the first case, a Cali-
fornia statute empowered the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board or any
member to "issue... all necessary process in proceedings for contempt, in like
manner and to the same extent as courts of record."'59 The delegation was
ruled valid."6 The second case goes even further. The California court held
that a statutory delegation is necessary for agencies to be vested with contempt
power. The Rhode Island court ruled that a workers' compensation commission-
er possessed criminal contempt power even without any statutory delegation:
"We believe that the power to hold persons in criminal contempt is also inher-
ent in performing the duties of the workers' compensation trial commission-
er.' 6' This holding was supported by no reasoning or authority; neither
Brimson nor any other case was cited. Instead, by its laconic ipse dixit, the
Rhode Island court rejected one of the fundamental limitations on administrative
power that has heretofore prevailed in our system.
The conclusion of the California and Rhode Island courts that agencies
may be vested with contempt power is contrary to our basic public law concep-
tions. The contempt power itself is so drastic that legal systems outside the
common-law world have refused to confer anything like it even on courts. To
vest it in administrative officials utterly ignores the separation of powers by
allowing agencies to exercise a power that is so inherently judicial.
In both the California and Rhode Island cases, the agencies imposed fines
as the contempt penalties. Yet if, as the California statute says, the agency has
the same contempt power as courts of record, the agency power should also
include that to commit for contempt. But that plainly violates the basic principle
laid down in Wong Wing v. United States, 2 which has been termed "one of
the bulwarks of the Constitution"'63 and has never been questioned in later
cases. It is the absence of nonjudicial powers of imprisonment that sharply
distinguishes our legal system from those we disparagingly describe as totalitar-
ian.16
4
Though agencies may not be vested with imprisonment powers, they may
be given the criminal-law power to impose fines. Here again there has been a
157. In re Investigation of Lauricella, 546 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
158. See Morton v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 238 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Ken-
nedy v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 519 A.2d 585 (R.I. 1987).
159. See Morton, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
160. See id.
161. Kennedy, 519 A.2d at 586.
162. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
163. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1387 (1953).
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quantum change from the earlier view that fines may be imposed only by crimi-
nal courts, not administrative agencies." The present-day approach is illus-
trated by a 1993 Texas decision that statutes which authorize agencies to assess
fines for violations of environmental laws are valid." In particular, they do
not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial. The court stressed the societal
changes since the earlier cases holding that there was a right to a criminal jury
trial before money penalties might be imposed.
To hold that [the law today must] merely parrot common law and statuto-
ry rights triable to a jury in 1876 would turn a blind eye to the emergence
of the modem administrative state and its profound impact on our legal
and social order. In the late 19th century, ours was primarily a sparsely-
populated agrarian society.... By contrast, concentrated industrial activi-
ty and its by-products, including the wide-spread emission of pollutants,
with their resulting potential for significant damage to our natural resourc-
es are phenomena of relatively recent origin. [TIhe legislature delegated
the power to assess these civil penalties to the [agency] as a manifestation




It is now almost half a century since Shapiro v. United States 61 laid
down the required-records doctrine, under which records required to be kept by
an agency are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Shapiro has been criticized, particularly because of its scope in
an era of pervasive record-keeping requirements which cut across every aspect
of the economic and social spectrum.69 The Supreme Court itself has not ex-
plicitly followed Shapiro since its pronouncement, which has led Justice Mosk
to characterize its rule as "of questionable vitality."'7 But Mosk spoke in dis-
sent in Craib v. Bulmash, where the Shapiro rule was expressly adopted by the
California court.
In Craib, the agency suspected that an employer had failed to pay overtime
wages and issued a subpoena directing production of time and wage records for
all persons employed the previous three years.' The lower court held that en-
forcement of the subpoena would violate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, because "both the contents of the records and the compulsory act of pro-
165. See ScHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 2.28.
166. See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993).
167. Id. at 451.
168. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
169. See ScHWARrT, supra note 91, § 3.3; Akhil Reed Amar & Renee P. Lettow, First Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 857, 868 (1995).
170. Craib v. Bulmash, 777 P.2d 1120, 1133 (Cal. 1989) (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also Baltimore Dep't
of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 557-59 (1990) (distinguishing Shapiro).
171. See Craib, 777 P.2d at 1123.
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duction amounted to incriminating testimony of... failure to pay the appropri-
ate wage."'" The California Supreme Court reversed, holding, "The privilege
does not apply where, as here, the reporting requirement is intended to promote
a legitimate regulatory aim, is not directed at activities or persons that are in-
herently 'criminal,' and only requires... disclosure of information of a kind
customarily kept in the ordinary course of business."'" Indeed, the court as-
serts, the enforcement of the wage requirements would be rendered ineffective
if the state were foreclosed from compelling the type of information sought
here. Hence, Shapiro was followed and the result was, as the caustic Mosk
comment put it, "importing the questionable federal required-records exception
into our state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.""7 Anomalous
though it may be, at least until Shapiro is overruled, agencies possess "virtually
the unchallengeable power to enforce its regulations by criminal prosecution
based on compelled self-disclosure."'75
Inspection Power
New York v. Burger, 6 decided at the beginning of the decade, marks the
culmination of the Supreme Court jurisprudence on administrative inspection'
power. During the prior twenty years, in a series of cases from Camara" to
Dewey,' the Justices had worked out the legal principles governing adminis-
trative inspections. New York v. Burger applied those principles and sums up
the federal law on the matter. Burger, the Court tells us, "presents the question
whether the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant
to a statute authorizing such a search, falls within the exception to the warrant
requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated indus-
tries."'79 To the Court, the question called for an affirmative answer. Though
Camara held that administrative inspections are normally subject to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, later cases developed an exception for
"closely regulated" businesses.' The Burger opinion analyzed the regulatory
statute and concluded without difficulty that "the operation of a junkyard, part
of which [was] devoted to vehicle dismantling," was a "closely regulated" busi-
ness in New York.'' In determining this, the mere volume of statutory mate-
rial on regulation is not dispositive' The focus should be on whether the
regulation was sufficiently comprehensive to come within the exception.'83 In
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1122.
174. Id. at 1131 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1134 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
176. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
177. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
178. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
179. Burger, 482 U.S. at 693.
180. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
181. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703-04.
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this case, the regulatory provisions were extensive enough to support the "close-
ly regulated" status of the business.'
The highest New York court has, however, declined to follow New York v.
Burger, holding instead, in People v. Scott, that the Burger statute violates
the New York Constitution's guaranty against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. In Scott, police officers, acting under the statutory authorization, conduct-
ed a warrantless inspection of defendant's business premises." 6 They discov-
ered stolen automobile parts and defendant was charged with criminal posses-
sion.' Under the Supreme Court's Burger decision, the warrantless search
should have been upheld. According to the New York court, nevertheless, Bur-
ger was based upon too narrow a view of the constitutional protection against
governmental intrusion on privacy: "Given... the potential similarity between
[colonial] writs of assistance and... administrative searches, the constitutional
rules governing the latter must be narrowly and precisely tailored to prevent the
subversion of the basic privacy values embodied in our Constitution."'88 In the
New York court's view, "the principles and standards set forth in New York v.
Burger... do not adequately serve those values."""89
To the administrative lawyer, the most important part of the Scott opinion
is its rejection of the Burger approach to "the essential element of pervasive
governmental supervision."'" Scott stressed that a close analysis of that re-
quirement was justified because "the administrative search exception should
remain a narrow and carefully circumscribed one."'' Scott did not try to de-
fine what constitutes a "pervasive" regulatory scheme, but it did assert that
"such minimal regulatory requirements as the obligations to register with the
government, to pay a fee and to maintain certain prescribed books and records
are not, in themselves, sufficient. Indeed, in modem society, many trades and
businesses are subject to licensing, bookkeeping and other similar regulatory
measures."'
92
Cases like Scott add new life to the Brandeis concept of the states as legal
laboratories. Independent state constitutional construction can point out defi-
ciencies in federal decisions and point the way to improvements that can be
adopted in federal administrative law itself: "by recognizing greater safeguards
as a matter of State law, [states] can serve as 'laboratories' for national
law." 19
4
184. See id. at 704.
185. 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
186. See id. at 1339.
187. See id.




192. Id. at 1344.
193. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
194. Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1348.
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Subpoena Power
The cases confirm that an agency subpoena has no legal effect until it is
enforced by a court. "[W]hile the subpoena may be issued and served by the
agency, the subpoenaed party must have the opportunity for judicial review
before suffering any penalties for refusing to comply..... Hence pre-enforce-
ment court challenges to agency subpoenas must be dismissed.' The respon-
dent has a full opportunity to raise any challenges in the subpoena enforcement
proceeding.
There has been a major change during the century in the judicial attitude
toward administrative subpoena power, culminating in the current court acquies-
cence in broad agency subpoena power.'" The Second Circuit summarizes
this development: "Until the 1940s, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the
scope of an agency's investigative authority. An administrative subpoena was
valid only if the agency sought evidence of a specific breach of law." '198 Un-
der this earlier approach, "courts would routinely disallow a general investiga-
tion conducted solely to determine policy, make rules, recommend legislation,
or ascertain whether administrative or other action was even appropriate.""
All this changed with Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins.' Beginning
with that case, "the Supreme Court underwent a change and significantly loos-
ened the shackles on an agency's power to conduct administrative investiga-
tions."20 ' As the Second Circuit sums it up, "The Supreme Court... held that
in the first instance, an agency could decide whether persons/entities were cov-
ered by the relevant statute and could exercise its subpoena power to investigate
whether a cause of action existed. ' '" Endicott Johnson has been characterized
by the Second Circuit as "a watershed in administrative investigations." 3 It
established, first of all, "that an agency could conduct an investigation even
though it had no probable cause to believe that any particular statute was being
violated."' This made for a basic change, since agency subpoenas were once
enforced only if issued upon probable cause to suspect "a specific breach of the
law. 2 5 Now, a state court tells us:
[I]t is... clear that such a restrictive view of the administrative process
is not constitutionally compelled. As regulatory schemes have become
increasingly important in enforcing laws designed to protect the public's
195. Craib v. Bulmash, 777 P.2d 1120, 1124-25 (Cal. 1989). See also United States v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1996) ("administrative subpoena is not self-executing").
196. See Texas Lawyers Ins. Exch. v. RTC, 822 F. Supp. 380 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
197. See I KENNr CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMiNISTPATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.1 (3d
ed. 1994).
198. United States v. Construction Prod. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1996).
199. Id. at 470.
200. 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
201. Construction Prod. Research, 73 F.3d at 470.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. See also Greer v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 671 A.2d 1080, 1085-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (no probable cause needed for agency to issue subpoena).
205. Construction Prod. Research, 73 F.3d at 470.
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health and welfare, reliance on "probable cause" as a means of restraining
agency subpoena power has all but disappeared."°
That is true because, "[alt the investigatory stage, the [agency] does not seek
information necessary to prove specific charges; it merely has a suspicion that
the law is being violated... and wants to determine whether or not to file a
complaint."' It can investigate upon such suspicion in a manner "analogous
to the Grand Jury"; like the latter, the agency "too, may take steps to inform
itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law." ' 3
In addition, Endicott Johnson established that the issue of jurisdiction or
coverage may not be raised as a defense to agency subpoena enforcement. As
the Second Circuit states the governing rule, "at the subpoena enforcement
stage, courts need not determine whether the subpoenaed party is within the
agency's jurisdiction or covered by the statute it administers; rather the cover-
age determination should wait until an enforcement action is brought against the
subpoenaed party."'
A typical case was decided by the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the
district court had prematurely resolved the jurisdictional issue.21 "It can no
longer be disputed," the court of appeals declared, "that 'a subpoena enforce-
ment proceeding is not the proper forum in which to litigate the question of
coverage under a particular statute.' ... 'The initial determination of the cover-
age question is left to the administrative agency seeking enforcement of the
subpoena."'21' This means "that an individual or entity may not generally re-
sist an administrative subpoena on the ground that the agency lacks jurisdic-
tion."212 The party resisting compliance with the subpoena may not challenge
the applicability of the agency statute to the conduct being investigated.213 The
agency itself is free to investigate whether the subject of the subpoena comes
within the agency's authority. 4
In addition, the recent cases show that agencies may possess authority to
investigate beyond strict jurisdictional limits. An illustrative case involved a
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) subpoena."' The board was con-
ducting an investigation of a bank, including certain loans. It subpoenaed the
records of a bank customer who had received disbursements from the amount
loaned. Though the customer was not subject to FHLBB regulation and the
board had no jurisdiction over it, F-LBB could investigate the relationship
206. Craib v. Bulmash, 777 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Cal. 1989).
207. FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
208. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
209. Construction Prod. Research, 73 F.3d at 470.
210. See EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (1lth Cir. 1991).
211. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 1985)). See also
United States v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) ("scope of agency's substantive au-
thority [is] not to be resolved in subpoena enforcement proceedings").
212. OTS v. Ernst & Young, 786 F. Supp. 46, 50 (D.D.C. 1992).
213. See Shulansky v. Rodriquez, 669 A.2d 560, 561 (Conn. 1995).
214. See Ernst & Young, 786 F. Supp. at 50. See also NLRB v. Carolina Food Processors, Inc., 81 F.3d
507 (4th Cir. 1996) (subpoena not unduly burdensome because it requires production of 4,000 documents).
215. See Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 878 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1989).
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between the customer and the loans that were the target of the board's inqui-
ry.216 Agency subpoena power is not confined to those over whom it may
exercise regulatory jurisdiction, but extends to any persons from whom it can
obtain information relevant and material to its legitimate inquiry."7 As another
federal court put it in a similar case, "In order to conduct an investigation an
agency may properly seek information from parties not ordinarily subject to the
agency's jurisdiction."2 "
Fishing License Revoked?"9
As already noted, this century has seen a major shift in the judicial attitude
toward administrative subpoena power. The early American Tobacco" re-
quirement of an actual case (or at least probable cause) has given way to the
Morton Salt-Endicott Johnson reliance on the investigatory grand jury" as
the proper analogy. In effect, this meant Supreme Court approval of administra-
tive "fishing expeditions."' During the past decade, however, some federal
courts have indicated that the fishing license thus given to agencies may be
subject to at least partial revocation. These courts have relied upon American
Tobacco to limit agency subpoenas calling for production of personal financial
records. Their view was best stated in Parks v. FDIC, 4 by a First Circuit
panel, which held that "although the FDIC [subpoena] met the lenient standard
of reasonableness for administrative subpoenas of corporate records, it failed to
meet the stricter standard of reasonableness that applied to administrative sub-
poenas of personal papers and records." In the court's view "the lenient
Morton Salt test for enforcement of an administrative subpoena" may require
neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion of wrongdoing as a
prerequirement for an agency subpoena, but a stricter standard should apply to
agency subpoenas of a private citizen's private papers than of corporate pa-
pers.'
The First Circuit panel's approach in Parks was, however, rejected in the
most recent case on the matter. The Second Circuit stated, "we are not persuad-
ed by the majority's reasoning in Parks that Morton Salt's reasonable relevance
216. See id. at 882.
217. See id.
218. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350, 1360 (D. Wyo. 1983).
219. See Jack W. Campbell, Note, Revoking the "Fishing License": Recent Decisions Place Unwarranted
Restrictions on Administrative Agencies Power to Subpoena Personal Financial Records, 49 VAND. L. REV.
395 (1996).
220. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
221. See supra text accompanying accompanying note 208.
222. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 197, at § 4.2, at 163.
223. These cases include RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Freese v. FDIC, 837 F. Supp.
22 (D.N.H. 1993).
224. No. 94-2262, 1995 WL 529629 (1st Cir. Sept. 13, 1995). The Parks v. FDIC panel opinion was
reported in the advance sheets and was withdrawn from the bound Federal Reporter after a rehearing en banc
was granted. The opinion is discussed in In re Gimbel, 77 F.3d 593 (2d Cir. 1996).
225. Parks, 1995 WL 529629, at *3.
226. Id. at *5.
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standard cannot apply to administrative subpoenas for directors' personal finan-
cial records."'  Instead, the Second Circuit specifically ruled that, even in a
case involving personal financial records, the Morton Salt approach would
apply.' The court conceded that there was language in Morton Salt indicat-
ing that corporations enjoy less protection than individuals in these cases.229
Such language, however, "is at least in the context of administrative subpoenas,
representative of an era that was still coming to terms with the modem regula-
tory state." ' The "more modem view of the regulatory state"'" recognizes
"that there is no reason to categorically restrict this [Morton Salt] standard to
corporate financial records." 2 Hence, "the Fourth Amendment requires no
showing beyond the standard articulated in Morton Salt where the FDIC seeks
the personal financial records of a director of a failed bank." 3 The agency
need not articulate probable cause or even an individualized "suspicion" of
wrongdoing to obtain enforcement of its subpoena. It "need only make a show-
ing that the materials sought are, in its view 'reasonably relevant' to its investi-
gation. ' z4
RIGHT To BE HEARD
Waiver and Emergency
According to a recent book, "Administrative law is a procedure-oriented
field.' 5 The first procedural question in any case is that of whether the pri-
vate party has a due process right to be heard. However, that right does not
require a hearing to be held in every case. More accurately, the due process
right is the right to an opportunity to be heard. 6 Like other rights, the right
to be heard can be waived, and it is the widespread waiver of the right that
makes the administrative process workable in practice. Reno v. Flores"7 con-
fimns this point. It concerned the INS procedure for dealing with juvenile aliens
who are detained prior to deportation."8 The INS notifies the juvenile alien of
the commencement of a deportation proceeding by a form that notifies the alien
of the allegations against him and the date of his deportation hearing. The INS
officer checks a box indicating whether the alien will be detained in INS custo-
227. In re Gimbel, 77 F.3d at 598.
228. See id. at 600.
229. See id. at 598.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 599. See also Greer v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 671 A.2d 1080 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (allowing subpoena of personal documents).
233. In re Gimbel, 77 F.3d at 600.
234. Id.
235. SusAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RErHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 40 (1992).
236. See Heft v. Racing Comm'n, 592 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Md. App. 1991). Cf. Sandin v. Connor, 115 S.
Ct. 2293, 2310 (1995) (no right to be heard where no factual dispute).
237. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
238. See id. at 294-95.
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dy, released on recognizance, or released under bond. The form then states:
"'You may request the Immigration Judge to redetermine thi' decision."' The
alien must check a box stating "I do" or a box stating I "do not request a rede-
termination by an Immigration Judge of the custody decision.""
Respondents claimed that the INS procedures were faulty because "they do
not provide for automatic review by an immigration judge of the initial deport-
ability and custody determinations. " ' According to the Court, however, "due
process is satisfied by giving the detained alien juveniles the right to a hearing
before an immigration judge." '4 That right can be waived here as in other
cases.242 It is enough that the form gives the opportunity to assert or waive the
right to the' hearing before the immigration judge.
The Supreme Court has also confirmed that there is no constitutional right
to be heard in cases where, because of an emergency, the luxury of a hearing
cannot be afforded. FDIC v. Mallen243 arose out of the FDIC power to sus-
pend an indicted bank official if continued service poses a threat to depositor
interests or impairs public confidence. The FDIC suspended a bank president
after he was indicted for false statements.2 There was no presuspension hear-
ing, but provision was made for a later hearing.245 The lower court held the
statutory procedure unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed even though
it recognized that the interest to continue as bank president was a property right
protected by due process.2 In this case the "emergency" exception applied.
The emergency arose from the nature of banking and the overriding need for
public confidence.24 Postponement of the hearing was justified by "the con-
gressional finding that prompt suspension of indicted bank officers may be
necessary to protect the interests of depositors and to maintain public confi-
dence in our banking institutions."24
Mathews Misapplied
Mathews v. Eldridge'49 had adopted a cost-benefit approach"50 to the
due process right to be heard. Under Mathews, three factors are to "be consid-
ered in determining whether ... due process ... [has] been satisfied." '' Jus-
tice O'Connor has summarized the three factors as "the nature of the private
interest, efficacy of additional procedures, and governmental interests."252 In
239. Id. at 308.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 309.
242. See SCHWAR'rZ, supra note 91, § 5.3.
243. 486 U.S. 230 (1988).
244. See id. at 238.
245. See id. at 238-39.
246. See id. at 240.
247. See id. at 241.
248. Id.
249. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
250. See Propert v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 961, 962 (D.D.C. 1990).
251. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980).
252. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 148 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Mathews, the balancing of these factors led to the holding that, though due pro-
cess required a hearing, a post-suspension hearing was enough to satisfy due
process. 3
The Mathews test was called forth by one of the crucial problems present-
ed by the Goldberg v. Kelly 4 revolution - that of the extent to which
nonregulatory administration should be subject to the judicialized procedural
requirements that have governed traditional regulatory administration. The
Mathews balancing approach was developed to help resolve the problem.
The Court, however, has not used the Mathews test only to determine what
procedure is required when there is a due process right to be heard. In Connect-
icut v. Doehr,'5 it employed the test to determine whether due process re-
quires a hearing, rather than simply to identify what kind of hearing due pro-
cess demands. Doehr arose under a state statute that authorized a judge to allow
prejuidgment attachment of real estate, without prior notice or hearing, upon
plaintiff's verification that there was probable cause to sustain the claim."
The Court determined the statute's validity by applying the Mathews test. All
the Justices agreed that it failed that test: (1) the interests affected were signifi-
cant; (2) the right of erroneous deprivation that the state permitted was substan-
tial; and (3) the interests in favor of an ex parte attachment were too minimal to
justify burdening Doehr's ownership rights without a hearing to determine the
likelihood of recovery. 7 On the other hand, under the Doehr approach, if a
court were to conclude that under the Mathews test, "the private interest...
affected [and] the risk of an erroneous deprivation were not substantial enough
to overcome the burden that would be placed on the government were a hearing
to be required," ' a hearing would not be required.
Doehr uses the Mathews test to determine whether a hearing is demanded
by due process. That is, however, a misuse of the test, which was developed
only to determine what type of notice and hearing is required. Once it is deter-
mined that there is a due process right to be heard, Mathews tells us what pro-
cess is due - i.e., the specific procedures that should be required. The Due
Process Clause has already tilted the balance in favor of some procedure:
Mathews only tells us what kind of hearing is demanded in the given case.
Doehr is but an instance of the Court's recent tendency to reduce due
process rights to the level of the countinghouse. Until recently, the question to
be determined in this type of case was whether a given constitutional right,
such as the due process right to be heard, had been violated. In administrative
law, this meant that there was a due process right to be heard whenever an
agency act affected a particular individual adversely in rights or entitlements.
No cost-benefit test to determine whether there was a right to notice and hear-
253. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 910.
254. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
255. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
256. See id. at 5-6.
257. See id. at 11-18.
258. Id. at 9 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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ing existed. The Mathews approach was used only after a right to be heard was
found, to determine what process was due. Under Doehr, this is changed:
Mathews has become the measuring rod as well on whether there is a due pro-
cess right to be heard.
Too Flexible Due Process?
Not long ago, when due process demanded a hearing, a full evidentiary
hearing was required. This approach has been giving way to the Mathews v.
Eldridge test, under which due process becomes a "flexible concept that varies
with the particular situation." 9 In effect, as seen, this makes for a cost-bene-
fit approach to due process, with its balancing of gains versus losses for each
additional procedure required. The key question is "whether the [additional]
incremental benefit could justify the cost."
Justice Stevens, however, has reminded us that the flexible cost-benefit
approach may be pushed too far.
It is wrong to approach the due process analysis in each case by asking
anew what procedures seem worthwhile and not too costly. Unless a case
falls within a recognized exception, we should adhere to the strongest
presumption that the Government may not take away life, liberty, or prop-
erty before making a meaningful hearing available.
The Stevens statement was made in dissent in Brock v. Roadway Express,
Inc.' 2 It arose under a statute that forbids discharge of employees for refusing
to operate motor vehicles that do not comply with safety standards or for filing
complaints alleging noncompliance.63 The statute provides for initial investi-
gation of a discharge and authorizes the Secretary of Labor to order temporary
reinstatement. The lower court held that the authorization to order temporary
reinstatement without first conducting an evidentiary hearing violated due pro-
cess.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, balancing the interests at stake,
all that was required was written notice and opportunity for written response; an
evidentiary hearing was not required. This holding led to Justice Stevens'
dissent. He disagreed with the Court's assertion that cross-examination was not
necessary, asserting "this reasoning unduly minimizes the critical role that
cross-examination plays in accurate factfinding." ' 5 "The flexibility on the
fringes of due process," Stevens declared, "cannot 'affect its root requirement"'
- i.e., that of "a hearing [which] necessarily includes the creation of a public
259. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
260. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977).
261. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 277-78 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. 481 U.S. 252 (1987).
263. See id. at 255.
264. See id. at 263.
265. Id. at 276 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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record developed in a proceeding in which hostile witnesses are confronted and
cross-examined."
In other words, the courts must be vigilant in ensuring that flexible due
process does not result in dilution of due process. The danger is that, by a legal
counterpart of Gresham's law, second-class procedures that provide only paper
hearings' will be permitted to take over the administrative field. The Stevens
admonition gains added impact from the recent trend to apply cost-benefit anal-
yses to the details of administrative procedure - particularly with regard to the
use of illegal evidence by agencies.'
ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE
Our law is procedure dominated:269 "Procedure, not substance, is what
most distinguishes our [system] from others.""27 It is, therefore, to be expected
that any ten-year period will see a plethora of administrative procedure cases.
So many and so diverse are the cases, indeed, that it is possible here to discuss
only the more significant ones: the treatment will be episodic rather than ency-
clopedic.
Vermont Yankee
The Supreme Court has applied the Vermont Yankee rule"l that the APA
"establishes the maximum procedural requirements a reviewing court may im-
pose upon agencies"2n to administrative adjudications. As stated by the Court,
"Vermont Yankee stands for the general proposition that courts are not free to
impose upon agencies specific procedural requirements that have no basis in the
APA."' a Vermont Yankee itself concerned additional procedures imposed by
the reviewing court when the agency was engaging in informal rulemaking. The
decision under discussion held that the informal adjudication process should be
governed by the same principles 4 The lower court had held the challenged
action invalid because the agency had not apprised the private party of the
materials on which it based its decision. Such a holding would be correct if the
case involved a formal adjudication subject to the trial-type procedures set forth
in the APA. Here, however, the determination was lawfully made by informal
adjudication and only the minimal requirements set forth in section 555 of the
APA have to be followed.275 They do not include the elements required by the
266. Id. at 278.
267. See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
268. See infra notes 417-42 and accompanying text.
269. See ROSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 235, at 40.
270. Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992).
271. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
272. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653 (1990).
273. Id. at 654.
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lower court. "A failure to provide them where the Due Process Clause itself
does not require them... is therefore not unlawful."'27
One may go further and state that the Vermont Yankee principle applies to
administrative procedure in general. This means that courts may normally not
fashion procedural obligations beyond those expressly enumerated in the gov-
erning statutes. Courts "are not free to impose our own notions of procedural
propriety upon [agencies]."' Instead, "[c]ourts must be reluctant to mandate
that a federal agency step through procedural hoops in effectuating its adminis-
trative role unless such procedural requirements are explicitly enumerated in the
pertinent statutes or otherwise necessary to address constitutional concerns." '27
Where a given procedure is not demanded by due process, a court may not
require the agency to provide it unless it is imposed by the APA or some other
statute. The APA thus imposes maximum as well as minimum procedural re-
quirements in the cases to which it is applicable.
Telephone Hearings
The agency hearing is, of course, the administrative equivalent of the trial
in a court. Unlike the latter, however, agency hearings are sometimes conducted
in ways that could not pass muster in the judicial process. Thus, in some states
agencies have developed the practice of holding telephone hearings in which
cases are presented to hearing officers over the telephone. Such hearings, with-
out a doubt, deprive the hearing officer of the opportunity to observe witness
demeanor. Despite this, there are cases that uphold telephone hearings. A state
court holds that they do not violate the rules governing hearings because of
alleged violation of the right to confront witnesses or the inability of the parties
or the hearing officer to view the witnesses and observe their nonverbal reac-
tions. 9 There is a similar federal case holding that such a hearing by a state
agency does not violate due process.80 Even if the court is correct, the hold-
ing should be applied with caution; telephone hearings should be the exception,
not the norm, in the administrative process. At a minimum, a telephone hearing
over objections should be ruled invalid without regulations protecting the
parties' rights."8
What about telephone hearings in federal agencies?
It may be doubted that federal agencies will be permitted to hold telephone
hearings. According to the Ninth Circuit, telephone hearings violate a statute
that provides that deportation determinations shall be made in proceedings
276. Id. at 655-56.
277. Wilderness Society v. Tyrrel, 918 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1990).
278. Id.
279. See Detroit Base Coalition v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 405 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Mich. App. 1987). See also
Conforti v. United States, 74 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1996) (agencies may notice such matters as are noticed
by courts).
280. See Casey v. O'Bannon, 536 F. Supp. 350, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
281. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 520 A.2d 953, 954-55 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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"before" an immigration judge.2 This requires that deportation hearings be
conducted in person rather than by telephone. The fact that telephone hearings
are used in Hawaii and Guam because of their distance from the mainland
cannot justify depriving parties of their statutory right to a hearing in the phys-
ical presence of the hearing officer. s3 The same approach should be applied
generally to hearings under the Federal APA, which states that an administra-
tive law judge "shall preside at the taking of evidence."2 4 It is hard to see
how one can "preside" at a hearing conducted outside his physical presence.
"Until Congress chooses to change the wording of the [APA], telephonic hear-
ings.., simply are not authorized by statute."'
Administrative Judiciary
Perhaps the most significant Federal APA improvement has been the de-
velopment of a virtual administrative judiciary. 6 The present administrative
law judge corps is the direct descendant (and, indeed, the logical outcome) of
the hearing examiner system established by the APA in 1946. The hearing
officers provided under the APA have evolved into administrative judges, en-
dowed with authority to make binding initial decisions in adjudicatory proceed-
ings. The change of title to administrative law judge (AL) has only confirmed
this development.
The evolving system of administrative justice brings to mind an opinion of
Justice Jackson, which referred to the distinction between American law, in
which one system of law courts applies both public and private law, and the
practice in a Continental country such as France, which administers public law
through a system of administrative courts separate from those dealing with
private law questions. 7 The French administrative courts are specialized tri-
bunals that review the legality of administrative acts.ss Although proposals
have been made for establishment of comparable American administrative
courts, the French concept of administrative reviewing courts has largely re-
mained foreign to American administrative lawyers."
Under the APA, however, our system has taken its own path toward estab-
lishment of an administrative judiciary - but, in the American version, an
administrative trial judiciary. The history of hearing officers under the APA,
282. See Purba v. INS, 884 F.2d 516, 517 (9th Cir. 1989).
283. See id.
284. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994).
285. Purba, 884 F.2d at 518. For a discussion of the recent pilot project in Maryland to conduct hearings
by video, see Patricia Salkin, Current Developments in Maryland - Video Hearings, ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Spring 1996, at 10-11.
286. See Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TUlSA L. 203, 209-
11 (1996).
287. See Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 495 (1953).
288. See generally BERNARD SCHWART, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW
WORLD 42-50 (1954).
289. Compare Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Act of 1970 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS.
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culminating in their present judicial status, has set the pattern for the developing
system of American administrative justice. In particular, we can project a con-
tinuing increase in the size of the administrative judicial corps. When the APA
provisions went into effect, the federal agencies employed 197 examiners. In
March 1996, there were 1,343 ALJs in thirty federal agencies;2 over 75%
(1,092) were in the Social Security Administration, reflecting the impact of that
agency's mass justice upon the administrative process."' Only the fiscal
squeeze of recent years has prevented the number from rising substantially
higher. In the next century, we can predict that there may well be a federal
administrative judiciary running into the thousands and ALJs in ever-increasing
numbers dispensing both regulatory justice and the mass justice of the Welfare
State.
Under the Federal APA, the ALJs are appointed by and work within the
different agencies vested with adjudicatory powers subject to APA formal hear-
ing requirements. An increasing number of states, on the other hand, have fol-
lowed the example first set by California in 19452' and set up a central pool
of independent ALJs, who are assigned to different agencies as they are needed.
During the past decade, eight states have established central ALJ panel systems
under which the ALJs are an independent cadre of judges, who are in an auton-
omous agency, not subject to or part of the agencies for which they render
adjudicatory decisions.293 By the end of 1995, twenty states had adopted cen-
tral panel ALJ systems.294 Bills have been introduced to establish an indepen-
dent federal ALJ corps,2 9 but they have thus far only crossed Woodrow
Wilson's Congressional "bridge of sighs to dim dungeons" of committee inac-
tion.2"
A primary purpose of the APA was to increase the importance of agency
hearing officers - now the ALJs.2" The cases during the decade have contin-
ued the trend in that direction. In particular, despite the Allentown holding29
that agencies reviewing ALJ initial decisions are not limited to appellate power,
but instead have all the decisionmaking powers of a tribunal of first instance,
the cases have increasingly relied on an emerging rule of agency deference
toward ALJ decisions. Under them, the ALJ or other hearing officer is the
primary judge of the evidence presented at the hearing.'l The federal cases
290. See Schwartz, supra note 286, at 213.
291. See id.
292. For the current version, see CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 11370.3, 11502 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
293. See Julian Mann, ImI, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 151, 157 (1995).
294. See id.
295. See Administrative Law Judge Corps Act, 1990: Hearings on S. 594 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Admin. Practices of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 467 (1990). Recent bills include
H.R. 1802, 104th Cong. (1995) and S. 486, 104th Cong. (1995).
296. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GovERN mN- 69 (10th prtg. 1894).
297. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
298. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1955).
299. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307-09 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036
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hold that, where there are disagreements between the agency head and the Aid
on questions of fact and credibility, the reviewing court may examine the evi-
dence more critically in deciding whether the agency decision is supported by
substantial evidence."° Thus, where the agency rejects the AL's findings of
fact, the evidence supporting the agency's conclusion may be viewed as "less
substantial" than it would be if the agency had reached the same conclusion as
the ALJ.30'
There are state cases that reverse where the agency substituted its judgment
for that of the hearing officer on factual findings or reversed such findings that
were supported by substantial evidence.3" A Florida case goes even further,
holding that an agency may not reject a hearing officer's finding unless there is
no competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be
inferred." 3 In effect, the cases have moved toward assimilating the ALE role
to that of a trial judge. At the least, the agency is required to explain why it has
rejected ALJ findings."'
Agency review power over the AL may, of course, be altered by statute.
In a D.C. Circuit case, 5 the statute empowered the agency head to "affirm,
modify, or vacate" the ALJ decision. According to then Judge Ginsburg,
"Whatever else Congress meant by the phrase 'affirm, modify, or vacate,' we
hold, it did not mean to disarm the agency head when the AiU incorrectly reads
the law in the charged party's favor."3' The agency head must retain the
power to correct the ALU's legal errors in order to remain "'the fimal admin-
istrative arbiter of legal questions.""'3 7 The same was not true with regard to
findings of fact. While the agency head bears the ultimate responsibility for
legal interpretations, he must follow the ALJ's key findings of fact, including
the ALU's determination of sanctions. Where facts are concerned, there is an
"incongruity [in] allowing an agency official who has seen only the paper re-
cord to substitute his judgment for that of an adjudicatory officer 'with indepen-
dent status, who saw the withesses' demeanor and gauged their
truthfulness.""'30
300. See Aylett v. Secretary of HUD, 54 F.3d 1560, 1565 (10th Cir. 1995); Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 933 (11th Cir. 1995).
301. See NLRB v. Stor-Rite Metal Prod., Inc., 856 F.2d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Gibson-Jones
v. Chater, 926 F. Supp. 747, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (AiU credibility determination not to be disturbed unless pa-
tently wrong).
302. See Goin v. Commission on Ethics, 658 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Berger v. Depart-
ment of Prof'l Regulation, 653 So. 2d 479 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1995); Moran v. Shotgun Willies, Inc., 889
P.2d 1185 (Mont 1995).
303. See Crawley v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 616 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). See also Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating an agency "must give
specific, legitimate reasons" for rejecting finding).
304. See Appeal of Dell, 668 A.2d 1024 (N.H. 1995); Coates v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 676 A.2d 742 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). See also Justice v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 465
S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (statute requires agency reasons for declining to adopt ALJ decision).
305. See Iran Air v. Kugelnan, 996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
306. Id. at 1260.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1261 (quoting Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Compare Halbrook
v. Chater, 925 F. Supp. 563, 575 (N.D. I1. 1996) (weight of Ai credibility determination in view of "cold
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An interesting variation of the problem of agency review power over hear-
ing officers was presented in a Pennsylvania case.3 9 The agency had adopted
a policy of suspending the licenses of all drivers convicted of exceeding a speed
limit by 31 or more miles per hour. All hearing officers were required to rec-
ommend such suspensions.1 The court held that this requirement violated the
hearing officer's obligation to exercise discretion based upon the individual
facts of each case.3 ' "If a hearing examiner must always recommend a sus-
pension regardless of the totality of the circumstances in a case, the discretion
of the hearing examiner is really no discretion."'
To be sure, the decision process of the agency in reviewing ALJs is pri-
marily for the agency heads themselves. Thus, as far as the agency decision
itself is concerned, it is settled that agency heads need not personally read the
record."' "Indeed," as a federal judge puts it, "common sense dictates other-
wise. If the Superintendent reviewed the record underlying every disciplinary
hearing conducted by the Department, he would have little time for anything
else." '314 One may go further and say that, because of the Morgan IV rule,"5
it is impossible to depose agency heads or require them to answer interrogato-
ries on how much attention they devoted to the record or the case in
generl 3 6
According to another D.C. Circuit case,317 discovery of the agency
decisionmaking process will be allowed in only two circumstances: 1) when
"there has been a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior" and 2)
"when such examination provides the only possibility for effective judicial
review and when there have been no contemporaneous ... [agency] find-
ings.""1 The second is present "[o]nly in the rare case in which the record is
so bare as to frustrate effective judicial review."31 9 One may wonder whether
even in such a case the proper posture is not to remand to the agency to have
the record completed rather than to probe the decider's mental processes.
The cases have been holding that agencies must provide reasoned explana-
tions, not only when they reject ALJ findings and decisions, but also when they
do not follow their own precedents. While an agency is not bound by its prece-
dents, the courts are increasingly requiring that it must provide a reasoned ex-
planation for departing from them: "Agencies do not have the same freedom as
courts to change direction without acknowledging and justifying the
change."3  An agency may not abandon an earlier position by simply terming
record").
309. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp. v. Bankston, 625 A.2d 1333 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
310. See id. at 1335.
311. See id. at 1337.
312. Id.
313. See Fisher v. Department of Soc. Serv., 600 So. 2d 1368 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
314. B.A.M. Brokerage Corp. v. New York, 718 F. Supp. 1195, 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
315. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
316. See Montgomery Nat'l Bank v. Clarke, 703 F. Supp. 1161 (D.N.J. 1989).
317. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Lujan, 908 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
318. Id. at 997.
319. Id. at 998.
320. Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1995). See also ANR Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 71 F.3d
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the earlier case in which it was applied "sui generis."32 Instead, the agency
must provide "a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards
are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored."3' Indeed, where the
FCC had failed to explain or even recognize its departure from agency prece-
dent and appellant suggested that it was the target of a personal grudge held by
senior officials in the agency, a concurrence declared, "Normally I would dis-
count such a claim, but the agency's handling of this case is so inexplicable
otherwise that appellant's suggestion is troubling. '3as
It should, however; be stressed that the requirement of reasons, both in the
cases just discussed and in general, is not interpreted in an over-technical man-
ner. In the recent words of a federal court, the decision "need not be a trail
emblazoned... with signposts detailing every minute fact that went into
the ... decisional process."324 The courts do not require that, before they will
approve an agency decision, "'every i must be dotted and every t crossed.""'3
At the same time, there must be an adequate agency explanation. It is, the
Ninth Circuit says, not enough for the agency to rely on "boilerplate" opinions
which set out general legal standards but do not adequately apply them to the
case's individualized circumstances.a
Bias
It is hornbook administrative law that "a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process." ''3 As the Ninth Circuit tells us, "This re-
quirement applies not only to courts, but also to... administrative agen-
cies. ' '3"s An administrative decision may not stand if either the hearing offi-
cer329 or the agency was infected with legal bias. One can go further and state
that the principles governing disqualification for bias are essentially the same
for agencies and courts.
There are, however, state cases that refuse to follow this rule. In a Missis-
sippi decision3  involving disqualification of a hearing officer in a school per-
sonnel termination case, the lower court had applied the disqualification stan-
dard applicable to judges and ruled that the hearing officer should have recused
himself. The state supreme court held that this was erroneous. Because "admin-
897 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reversing agency departure from precedent without reasoned explanation).
321. Trunkline LNG Co. v. FERC, 921 F.2d 313, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
322. WLOS TV, Inc. v. FCC, 932 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). See also Western States Petroleum v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280
(9th Cir. 1996) (agency did not provide any explanation for departure from prior norms).
323. WLOS TV, 932 F.2d at 998 (Silberman, J., concurring).
324. C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1004 (D.NJ. 1995).
325. Id. at 1005 (quoting Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1107 (2d Cir. 1973)).
326. See Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68
F.3d 1396, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding decision improper when "agency merely parrots the language of a
statute").
327. Withrow v. Larken, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
328. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995).
329. See Pastrana v. Chater, 917 F. Supp. 103 (D.P.R. 1996).
330. See Byrd v. Greene County Sch. Dist., 633 So. 2d 1018 (Miss. 1994).
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istrative hearings 'are not trials and... are not governed by the same rules
which apply in courts of law,"' the disqualification standard for judges was not
applicable." t Instead, an agency adjudicator will not be disqualified when
"[tihere is no evidence that he had any personal or financial interest in the
outcome of the case or that he had any feelings of personal animosity toward [a
party] .332
This, too, is administrative law heresy. If there is one principle that gov-
erns administrative procedure, it is that stated by a Tennessee court: "When
agency members are performing adjudicatory functions, they must abide by the
same disqualification standards that are applicable to judges."'333 If anything,
indeed, as the Third Circuit points out, the bias requirement should be stricter in
an agency: "The due process requirement of an impartial decisionmaker is ap-
plied more strictly in administrative proceedings than in court proceedings
because of the absence of procedural safeguards normally available in judicial
proceedings. 334
The ruling of another state court also appears inconsistent with the proper
bias posture.335 The case arose out of a telephone rate hearing before the state
regulatory commission. The company sought a court order disqualifying a com-
missioner after he revealed that he had been secretly acting as an informant in
an ongoing FBI investigation into allegedly improper conduct by company
employees involving his fellow commissioners. The Oklahoma court recognized
that it might have the power "to disqualify a corporation commissioner, if he
were sitting in a judicial capacity."336 That, however, was not the case here
because "[r]ate hearings are legislative in nature."337 To support that proposi-
tion, the court relied on the 1908 Prentis case 33' and the more recent Supreme
Court reaffirmation of its holding that ratemaking is a legislative act.3 9 Be-
cause this was not a judicial proceeding in which the commissioner was per-
forming an adjudicatory function, "due process requirements, including neutrali-
ty,," were not demanded. Instead, the proceeding was legislative in nature.
"Commissioner Anthony was acting in a legislative capacity which did not
require him to comply with judicial standards of conduct. Accordingly, this
Court is without jurisdiction to disqualify Commissioner Anthony from partici-
pation in this or any other SWB rate hearing."'
41
331. Id. at 1022-23 (quoting United Cement Co. v. Safe Air for the Environment, Inc., 558 So. 2d 840,
842 (Miss. 1990)).
332. Id. at 1023.
333. Tennessee Cable Television Ass'n v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 844 S.W.2d 151, 164 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1992).
334. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995).
335. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 873 P.2d 1001 (Okla. 1994).
336. Id. at 1008.
337. Id. at 1005.
338. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
339. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 371 (1989).
340. Southwestern Bell, 873 P.2d at 1006.
341. Id. at 1007.
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It is undoubtedly true that the strict adjudicatory rule against bias does not
apply in rulemaking proceedings,342 and that ratemaking is legislative in char-
acter. 43 Yet that should be the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry into the
matter. Ratemaking may be legislative in character, but it is also particular in
applicability. When an agency fixes telephone rates, there is only one company
whose rates are being fixed. Regardless of its theoretical legislative nature, the
proceeding is an adversary one, with the company and the agency opposing
parties who can best present their sides in a trial-type format.
In particularized ratemaking, due process requires an evidentiary hearing
similar to that required in adjudicatory proceedings. Particularized rate-making
requires adversarial, trial-type hearings, governed by due process procedural
safeguards - including the rule against bias. That has been the established law
since the decision in Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler.3" In that case,
both the opinion of the Court and the dissent by Justice Field proceed upon the
principle that "the rates shall be established by an impartial tribunal""34 - one
whose members are not infected by bias. To hold the contrary is to make a
decision that, to put it charitably, is contrary to both established administrative
law principles and all the jurisprudence on the matter. In rate-making, as in
purely adjudicatory proceedings, "appellant was entitled to an impartial deci-
sion-maker who had not prejudged the issues."3"
In another important respect, the decade's bias cases took important steps
forward. The cases have long recognized disqualifying bias where the adjudica-
tor has a financial interest in the case or is tainted by personal bias.347 What
happens, however, when there is prejudgment by the adjudicator? The leading
case on the matter used to be FTC v. Cement Institute,3" which ruled that pre-
judgment alone does not constitute legal bias, since it "did not necessarily mean
that the minds of [the agency] members were irrevocably closed."349
The difficulty with Cement Institute is that, as the Davis-Pierce treatise
points out, "as a practical matter, it makes proof of closed minds virtually im-
possible."35 It is scarcely surprising then that no adjudicator has been "held dis-
qualified on account of closed minds, because proof of closed minds is nor-
mally impossible and because an allegation of closed minds is likely to bring
the response the Court gave in the Cement Institute case."35 '
Cement Institute has never been overruled by the Supreme Court. Despite
that, the lower courts have substituted for its strict rule for the rule recently
342. See Organized Fishermen v. Franklin, 846 F. Supp. 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
343. See supra text accompnaying note 337.
344. 110 U.S. 347 (1884).
345. Id. at 363.
346. Michigan Intra-State Motor Tariff Bureau v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 504 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993). See also New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 448 A.2d 272 (Me. 1982).
347. See SCHWART-, supra note 91, §§ 6.17-6.18.
348. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
349. Id. at 701.
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stated by the Ninth Circuit - that legal bias exists when a plaintiff can "show
that the adjudicator 'has prejudged, or reasonably appears to have prejudged, an
issue""'3 2 The changed law in the matter can be seen in a 1990 New York deci-
sion which held that public statements made by the Chairman of the State Li-
quor Authority (SLA) concerning charges then pending in an SLA proceeding
disqualified the Chairman from participating in the administrative review pro-
cess.3 Both the accused killer and the victim in the highly publicized so-
called "preppie murder" case had been in petitioner restaurant shortly before the
crime 4 Petitioner had then been charged by the SLA with selling liquor to
underage patrons."' Just before the hearing the SLA Chairman testified before
a legislative committee.35 His statement indicated that petitioner was guilty
and "I am going to bring [petitioner] to justice."357 The Chairman refused to
disqualify himself from sitting on review of an AJ decision. 8
The SLA Chairman may have prejudged the case, but it had not been
shown that he had the "irrevocably closed mind" required by Cement Institute.
The New York court, nevertheless, ruled that the SLA decision must be an-
nulled. The Chairman's testimony evidenced his "belief that petitioner had in
fact violated the law regarding the sale of alcohol to minors." '359 Where an
agency official evinces such prejudgment, he must disqualify himself. In such a
case, "a disinterested observer may conclude that [he] has in some measure ad-
judged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing
it."' That prejudgment is enough to demonstrate legal bias.36'
It is, of course, by now settled law that the mere combination of functions
in an agency does not make its procedure unfair.362 However, there is a dis-
tinction between combining functions in an agency and the exercise of inconsis-
tent functions by the same person. For example, where an adjudicator refers
charges against a police officer, he must recuse himself from sitting on the
panel that adjudicates those charges.363 The same is true where the same per-
son participates at different levels of the adjudicatory process."
352. Slivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732,741 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kenneally v Lungren, 967 F.2d 329,333
(9th Cir. 1992)).
353. See 1616 Second Ave. Restaurant, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 550 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y.
1990).
354. See id. at 911.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 913.
358. See id. at911.
359. Id. at 913.
360. Id. at 912.
361. See Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1989); Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brown, 912
S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1995). On the rule of necessity, see General Motors Corp. v. Rosa, 624 N.E.2d
142 (N.Y. 1993).
362. See Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. EPA, 81 F.3d 1371, 1385 (5th Cir. 1996); Swafford v. Dade
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 469 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. 1996); Artman v. State Bd. of Registration, 918 S.W.2d 247
(Mo. 1996).
363. See Scalzi v. Altoona, 583 A.2d 1150 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
364. For a more recent case, see Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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To administrative lawyers today the principle just stated is an all but obvi-
ous aspect of the right to a fair adjudication, but the law has only recently
become settled to that effect. Not long ago, the leading case on the matter was
Eisler v. United States,3" which refused to disqualify a judge who had been
legal adviser to the FBI in the very investigation out of which the case arose.
According to the court of appeals, "Impersonal prejudice resulting from a
judge's background or experience is not... within the purview of the statute"
providing for disqualification.3"
Years ago I urged that Eisler should not be followed in cases involving
administrative agencies. 67 Cases during the past decade show that the courts
now accept this view. Another New York case strikingly illustrates this. 6 The
SLA had served notices of proceedings to revoke and suspend a license, charg-
ing violations of the liquor law. The notices were issued with the stamped sig-
nature of "Sharon L. Tillman, Counsel to the Authority."6 9 After hearings, the
AL) sustained the charges factually and, referred the matter to the SLA (com-
posed of five Commissioners) for final determination. 7 In the interim,
Tillman left her position as Counsel to become an SLA Commissioner."' The
Commissioners then voted to adopt the AIJ's findings, sustain the charges and,
impose a penalty of revocation and a bond forfeiture." Commissioner
Tillman concurred in the dispositions."D The New York court ruled that the
SLA decision was invalid: "The challenge here is not to the dual investigato-
ry/adjudicatory role of the agency. Rather it concerns an individual's partic-
ipation, as advocate for the agency's position, in the very matter over which she
is later required to pass impartial judgment."'74 The agency, as such, may in-
vestigate, prosecute, and adjudicate, but that does not mean that the same indi-
viduals within the agency may exercise both prosecutorial and judicial func-
tions. "Tillman's role as Beer Garden's 'prosecutor' in this case was inherently
incompatible with her subsequent participation as its Judge.... That circum-
stance and fundamental fairness require that she recuse herself." 75
Despite Eisler, then, the recent cases hold that an agency official who
participates in the investigation or prosecution of the particular case should be
disqualified from hearing or deciding. A Michigan court states this principle as
an aspect of prejudgment, ruling that bias exists where the adjudicator "might
have prejudged the case because of prior participation as an accuser, investiga-
tor, fact finder or initial decisionmaker." 76 In administrative agencies today,
365. 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
366. Id. at 278.
367. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 312 (Ist ed. 1976).
368. See Beer Garden, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 590 N.E.2d 1193 (N.Y. 1992).
369. See id. at 1194.




374. Id. at 1198.
375. Id. at 1199.
376. Michigan Intra-State Motor Tariff Bureau v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 504 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Mich.
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participation by the same person at different levels of the adjudicatory process
is not permitted.
Counsel
Counsel is, of course, recognized as a right in the administrative process as
it is in the courts. There are, however, limitations upon that right in agencies
that would not be permitted in the courts. Just before the period covered by this
article, the Supreme Court upheld a statutory $10 limitation upon attorney's
fees in veterans' benefit proceedings.3" According to Justice Scalia, the deci-
sion was based upon the determination that the government should administer
benefits in a nonadversarial fashion so that claimants would receive the entire
award without having to share it with an attorney.378 United States Department
of Labor v. Triplett concluded that the government had the same legitimate
interest in a statute prohibiting attorney's fees in black lung cases except as
approved by the Department of Labor.379 The Department's regulations invali-
dated all contractual fee arrangements. Respondent attorney violated the fee
scheme when he agreed to represent claimants on a contingent-fee basis and
collected fees without the required approval. The state court ruled the fee re-
striction unconstitutional because it effectively denied access to counsel.38
The ruling was based upon the statements of three attorneys before a congres-
sional committee that many lawyers would not take black lung cases.3 '
In reversing the Supreme Court declared:
This will not do.... [T]his sort of anecdotal evidence will not overcome
the presumption of regularity and constitutionality to which a program
established by Congress is entitled.... The impressions of three lawyers
that the current system has produced "few" lawyers, or "fewer qualified
attorneys" (whatever that means), and that "many" have left the field, are
blatantly insufficient to meet respondent's burden of proof, even if entire-
ly unrebutted.3"
Moreover, there were statistics showing that claimants were represented by
counsel in most cases-nonanecdotal evidence that, according to the Court,
"suggest[s] that claimants whose chances of success are high enough to attract
contingent-fee lawyers have no difficulty finding them."3 3 One may, however,
wonder if there is not a discrepancy here. In view of the regulations invalidat-
ing all contractual fee arrangements, how can such claimants secure contingent-
fee lawyers? The Court notes that the lower "court did not explain why the
Keynesian imperative of cash-on-the-barrelhead has not eliminated the contin-
App. 1993).
377. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
378. See United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990).
379. See id. at 721-26.
380. See id. at 719.
381. See id. at 723.
382, Id. at 723-24.
383. Id. at 724.
1997]
43
Schwartz: A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
gent fee." 84 But neither did the Court opinion that nevertheless relied upon
the presumption that claimants could attract contingent-fee lawyers.
Evidence
The cases during the decade continue to rule that agencies are not bound
by the courtroom rules of evidence. 35 This means, the Sixth Circuit tells us,
that "relevant evidence not admissible in court, including hearsay, is admissible
at an administrative hearing. ' ,386 There is, however, a fundamental difference
between the admission of incompetent evidence and reliance upon it in reaching
a decision. This is, of course, the basis of the legal residuum rule, 87 which
has been rejected by the Oregon court,388 but continues to be followed by the
other state courts that have considered the matter.389
Richardson v. Perales3' refused to require the legal residuum rule in fed-
eral agencies. However, the Court there stressed the right to subpoena and
cross-examine the reporting physician.' Despite this, the Sixth Circuit upheld
an agency refusal to issue a subpoena to a supplemental security income claim-
ant to cross-examine the examining physician whose report had been used by
the agency in denying the claim.a The court held both that the claimant had
failed to comply with a regulation requiring the subpoena applicant to provide
the agency a timely explanation of why the subpoena was necessary and that
the doctor's testimony was not in fact necessary. 9 It may, nevertheless, be
questioned whether the latter determination can really be made before it is
known what the testimony will be. And what of the Perales implication of the
right to a subpoena in such a case? The Sixth Circuit answered by stating, "We
do not read Perales as suggesting that the right to subpoena witnesses is
'absolute' in the sense that a party who requests a subpoena is automatically
entitled to its issuance whether or not he has complied with the published rules
governing such matters."394 The court assumed that, if the Perales claimant
384. Id. at 725. See also Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726 (5th Cir. 1996) (AUL heightened duty to virtually
represent pro se SSI claimant). For a case where the agency violated the right to counsel, see Crimi v.
Droskoski, 630 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 1996).
385. See, e.g., Espinoza v. INS, 62 F.3d 395 (9th Cir. 1995); Crawford v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
50 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
386. Tyra v. Secretary of HHS, 896 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir. 1990). See also Felzgerek v. INS, 75 F.3d
112 (2d Cir. 1996); Mosby v. Louisiana, 672 So. 2d 246 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
387. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 7.4.
388. See Reguero v. Teacher Standards and Practices Comm'n, 789 P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). It has
also been rejected in New York. See EJG Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 624 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div.
1995).
389. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 7.4; 2 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 406-10
(2d ed. 1965). For a recent case, see Wagstaff v. Department of Employment Sec., 826 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
390. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
391. See id. at 402, 404-05.
392. See Calvin v. Chater, 73 F.3d 87 (6th Cir. 1996).
393. See id. at 91.
394. Id. at 92. See also Feliciano v. Chater, 901 F. Supp. 50 (D.P.R. 1995).
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had filed a request that failed to demonstrate need as required by the regulation,
the result in the case would have been the same. 9
The basic principle governing agency use of evidence is that of exclusive-
ness of the record. It prohibits an agency from relying upon evidence outside
the record. Thus, where the AUJ in a disability case relies on a post hearing
report, the decision is invalid; the claimant has the right to a supplemental
hearing and must be notified of that right?' The exclusiveness of the record
principle depends upon the existence of an adequate record in the given case.
There is an agency duty to provide such a record in an adjudicatory proceeding.
However, there is no Griffin v. Illinois" constitutional right to a free tran-
script in an administrative proceeding.398 The record itself used to consist of
the stenographic transcript of the evidence and arguments presented at the hear-
ing. In recent years, more and more agency hearings have been recorded on
tape.3 What happens, however, if the tape recording is incomplete or inaudi-
ble?
Where the entire tape recording of the hearing is destroyed, a new hearing
is required.' However, according to the Ninth Circuit, unavailability of the
testimony of two witnesses because of recorder malfunction is not harmful
error, where the record is still sufficient for meaningful review." More debat-
able is a Seventh Circuit decision where the electronic transcript of the hearing
before the immigration judge contained 292 notations to the effect that a word
or words in testimony were "indiscernible" or "inaudible."' In consequence,
said the court, "we can assume for purposes of this appeal that the government
breached its duty to prepare a reasonably accurate, reasonably complete tran-
script." 3 Despite this, the court refused to invalidate the INS action. It in-
voked the harmless error rule, saying that petitioner's lawyer "made no effort to
show that the testimony that was not transcribed was material. The lawyer
could have submitted an affidavit based on his own recollections, or those of
his client, or [other witnesses]." One wonders if this does not place too
great a burden upon the private party. The large number of gaps in the tape
appear to have made it most difficult for petitioner to show how the record's
deficiencies "affected the outcome." In spite of its criticism, the court, in effect,
affirmed an agency's "sloppy handling of the record." 5
395. See Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92 (noting that claimant in Perales had not requested a subpoena at all).
396. See Gauthney v. Shalala, 890 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
397. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
398. See Smith v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv., 573 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1991); Abdullah v.
INS, 921 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
399. See Gearan v. Department of HHS, 838 F.2d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
400. See Pida v. Department of Motor Vehicles and Safety, 803 P.2d 229 (Nev. 1990).
401. See Morales v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 932 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1991).
402. Ortiz-Salas v. INS, 992 F.2d 105, 106 (7th Cir. 1993).
403. Id.




Schwartz: A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Official Notice
The most important exception to the exclusiveness of the record principle
is the doctrine of official notice. Under it, "Notice is a way to establish the
existence of facts without evidence."' Official notice is, of course, the ad-
ministrative counterpart of judicial notice.' Yet, as Judge Kleinfeld points
out, "The appropriate scope of notice is broader in administrative proceedings
than in trials." ' That is true, he says, because "A case before an administra-
tive agency, unlike one before a court, 'is rarely an isolated phenomenon, but is
rather merely one unit in a mass of related cases [which] often involve fact
questions which have frequently been explored by the same tribunal' .... The
tribunal learns from its cases."'
In addition, Judge Kleinfeld refers to a practical consideration not previ-
ously considered in cases and commentaries on the matter. As he puts it:
[Volume and repetition affect peoples' ability to pay attention. Because
of the quantity of similar cases before an agency such as the INS, if no-
tice is not taken more broadly in administrative hearings, litigants may
have an uphill battle maintaining the attention- of the administrative judg-
es. Even if the law allows people to tell officials the exact same and obvi-
ous thing hundreds of times, the officials may find it very hard to listen
attentively after the first dozen or two repetitions. Hearings may degener-
ate into an empty form if the adjudicators cannot focus attention upon
what is noteworthy about the particular case. The broader notice available
in administrative hearings may, if properly used, facilitate more genuine
hearings, as opposed to hearings in which the finder of fact hears, but
cannot, because of the repetition, listen.41
The Kleinfeld statements were made in a Ninth Circuit case where the
issue was the taking of official notice in a Nicaraguan applicant's asylum appli-
cation proceeding of the change in government with the assumption of control
by an anti-Sandinista coalition after a free election in Nicaragua."1 ' The court
held that notice may be taken of the free election and change in government
since they were "not debatable. It would be a waste of time to allow evidence
regarding them. 41
2
Nevertheless, the agency could not conclude summarily that the anti-
Sandinista applicants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution were they
to return to Nicaragua:
[T]he administrative desirability of notice as a substitute for evidence can-
not be allowed to outweigh fairness to individual litigants. Unregulated
notice, even of legislative facts, gives finders of fact "a dangerous
406. Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1992).
407. See, e.g., In re Griffith, 585 N.E.2d 937 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
408. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1026.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1027.
411. See id. at 1020-21.
412. Id. at 1027. Compare Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
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freedom."... Notice of facts without warning may deny "the fair hearing
essential to due process," and amount to "condemnation without trial.
'4 13
In this case, the agency had erred in taking notice without offering the appli-
cants an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. 4 Despite the election, the
Sandinistas might have retained sufficient power to persecute petitioners, so that
petitioners would still have a well-founded fear of persecution if they should
return to Nicaragua.1 While the official notice is permitted, it is subject to
the fundamental safeguard that notice facts may not be taken of debatable facts
without warning and an opportunity for rebuttal. 6 That is required both by
the Federal APA417 and, according to the Ninth Circuit, by due process as
well.
Exclusionary Rule
Soon after INS v. Lopez-Mendoza41  used a cost-benefit approach to hold
that the exclusionary rule did not apply in an administrative proceeding,419 I
expressed the hope that the state courts would follow the example of the Okla-
homa Supreme Court' ° and reject the Lopez-Mendoza approach.42 During
the decade, however, the trend has been the other way, with the state courts that
have considered the matter following the Lopez-Mendoza ruling that the
exclusionary rule does not govern in an agency hearing.4'
The most important of these state cases has been Boyd v. Constantine,4'
where the New York court adopted the Lopez-Mendoza balancing approach.
Boyd arose out of an unlawful search of a police officer's car, in which a bag
of marijuana was found.42 The evidence was suppressed in a criminal case
but found admissible in an administrative proceeding that resulted in the
officer's dismissal.4' Under the balancing approach, the evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure was ruled admissible by the New York
court. As the court saw it, "there would be no secondary deterrent effect in
applying the exclusionary rule to this administrative proceeding, and the burden
of excluding the evidence outweighs the benefit to society of obtaining the truth
regarding a State Trooper's possession of marijuana. '
413. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1027.
414. See id. at 1029-31.
415. See id. at 1031.
416. See Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 1996). But see Gonzalez v. INS, 77 F.3d 1015 (7th
Cir. 1996); Man v. INS, 69 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 1995) (agency not required to give opportunity to rebut similar
taking of official notice).
417. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1994).
418. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
419. See id. at 1033. Lopez-Mendoza itself was a deportation case.
420. See Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986).
421. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 7.12.
422. The one exception has been the Illinois court in People v. Krueger, 567 N.E.2d 717 (ill. Ct. App.
1991).
423. 613 N.E.2d 511 (N.Y. 1993).
424. See id. at 511-12.
425. See id. at 512.
426. Id. See also Juan C. v. Cortines, 647 N.Y.S.2d 491 (App. Div. 1996) (exclusionary rule applies when
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My writings on the subject427 indicate my agreement with the dissenting
opinion of Judge Titone, who asserted that "the 'balancing' approach, which has
no real objective criteria, can lead to result-oriented decision-making and, ulti-
mately, to the devaluation of the exclusionary rule as an important component
of our system of constitutional enforce- ment.' '42' The Titone dissent parallels
my own criticism. As one writer summarizes my view, "To Schwartz... [i]t is
anomalous to enforce opposite rules in administrative and criminal proceedings
concerning evidence blighted by the same pollution; an unlawful search violates
the identical privacy, whether its fruits are used to convict in a criminal case or
to forfeit a personal right in an agency proceeding."'429
Even more important, as Judge Titone stresses, "the 'balancing' approach
is inherently weighted against application of the exclusionary rule, since it
focuses on the facts in the individual situation before the court rather than the
broader societal concerns that led to the development of the suppression princi-
ple.""43 The Lopez-Mendoza cost-benefit approach allows an agency to avail
itself of the fruits of unlawful activity. It is "straining constitutional discourse
through a... sieve in which the 'costs (usually tangible and visible) are sup-
posedly 'balanced' against the 'benefits' (usually ephemeral and diffuse) of
treating [the Fourth Amendment right] seriously." 3'
Almost needless to state, this writer agrees with the Ninth Circuit that "the
right to invoke the exclusionary rule at an administrative proceeding would
carry a reassuring aura of fairness."432 Hence, even those courts that follow
Lopez-Mendoza should recognize the important Ninth Circuit exception to the
rule that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in agency proceedings. In Gon-
zalez-Rivera v. INS,433 the immigration judge had found that border patrol
officers had stopped an alien in a car solely because of his Hispanic appear-
ance.43 The Ninth Circuit held that such a stop was not based on reasonable
suspicion and thus constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.435 Under Lopez-
Mendoza, that alone would not require the evidence obtained by the officers to
be excluded. The court noted, however, that Lopez-Mendoza had specifically
stated, "we do not deal here with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or
other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and under-
*mine the probative value of the evidence obtained."436 Lopez-Mendoza then
evidence was obtained by same agency that seeks to use it in an administrative hearing).
427. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, §§ 7.11-7.12.
428. Boyd, 613 N.E.2d at 517 (Titone, J., dissenting).
429. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADmNISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYsTEM 571 (2d ed. 1988).
430. Boyd, 613 N.E.2d at 517 (Titone, J., dissenting). For other cases holding that the exclusionary rule is
not applicable in administrative proceedings, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 7.12. For more recent cases,
see Krueger v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 493 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1992); Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d
1303 (Me. 1988); Green v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. CL App. 1991); Merrifield v. Motor
Vehicles Div., 807 P.2d 329 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
431. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES viii (1985).
432. In re Establishment Inspection of Hein Iron Works, Inc., 881 F.2d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 1989).
433. 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
434. See id. at 1442.
435. See id. at 1443.
436. See id. at 1448 (quoting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984)).
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cited Rochin v. California,437 where the police had forcibly extracted narcotic
pills with a stomach pump. The police conduct, said the Rochin Court, "shocks
the conscience."438 According to the Ninth Circuit, it was not only such con-
duct that constituted "an egregious constitutional violation" '439 for purposes of
the exception to the Lopez-Mendoza rule. "Instead .... all 'bad faith viola-
tion[s] of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights' are considered sufficiently
egregious to 'required application of the exclusionary [rule]."'" In this case,
the Ninth Circuit concluded, the stop based solely on race was a bad faith con-
stitutional violation: "[When an INS officer makes a stop based solely on race,
he or she has deliberately violated the law or has acted in conscious disregard
of the Constitution." ' That being the case, Lopez-Mendoza notwithstanding,
"we conclude that the officers' conduct in this case constituted a bad faith,
egregious constitutional violation that warrants the application of the
exclusionary rule."" 2
Burden of Proof
The accepted rule governing the burden of proof in agency proceedings-
both before and under the APA-has been "the traditional preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard."" 3 It was, therefore, surprising that there was a conflict in
the circuits on whether the APA prohibits the "true doubt" rule followed by
agencies in federal black lung and workers' compensation cases. The rule was
applied when the evidence in favor of and the evidence against a claimant's
disability were equally balanced; the rule required the agency to resolve "all
true doubts" in favor of the claimant and to hold in his favor. The Supreme
Court has, however, resolved the matter in Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs, Department of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries,"4 holding
that the rule violated section 7(c) of the APA.
Despite the circuit decisions the other way, the issue does not appear diffi-
cult. Under section 7(c), a decision may not be made unless the case is proved
by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 As the Greenwich Collieries opinion
put it, "Under the... true doubt rule, when the evidence is evenly balanced the
claimant wins. Under § 7(c), however, when the evidence is evenly balanced,
the benefits claimant must lose. Accordingly, we hold that the true doubt rule
violates § 7(c) of the APA."'
437. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
438. Id. at 172
439. Gonzales-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1442.
440. Id. at 1449 (quoting Adamson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir.
1984)).
441. Id. at 1450.
442. Id. at 1452.
443. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981). See also Goffv. Dailey, 991 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1993);
Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1996). For a case where
a higher standard of proof is required, see Bottles v. State, 917 P.2d 471 (Okla. 1996).
444. 114 S.Ct. 2251 (1994).
445. See Steadman, 450 U.S. at 102.
446. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. at 2259. See also Consolidation Coal v. McMahon, 77 F.3d 898
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"In the not-so-distant past," Judge Kozinski tells us "a government agency
in the Soviet Union could impose controls on the production of commodities
without bothering to involve the public in the decisionmaking process. By con-
trast, a government agency in the United States must usually give notice to, and
accept comments from, the public before undertaldng to place manacles on the
invisible hand."' 7
The notice and comment requirement applies, of course, only to agency
acts that can be classified as "rules." Justice Scalia confirms that "the most
significant portions of the APA are based" upon the rulemaking-adjudication
dichotomy.' Since enactment of the APA, the courts have been troubled by
the question of whether a given agency act is a "rule" and hence subject to the
notice and comment requirement. Determining whether an agency's statement is
a rule or an order "can be a difficult exercise.""' 9 The cases continue to hold
that the label used by the agency is not determinative. They have "rejected the
notion that the nature of the agency's proceedings might depend upon their
form.' '4"' Thus, the fact that the agency called its regulation a "standard" did
not excuse its failure to follow APA rulemaking requirements.4"1
In Lincoln v. Vigil, 2 the Supreme Court had to decide whether agency
action was a rule. At issue was the action of the Indian Health Service in termi-
nating a clinical services program for handicapped Indian children.453 Petition-
er claimed that before terminating the program, the Service had to follow the
notice and comment rulemaking provisions of the APA.454 The Service argued
that its decision to terminate did not qualify as a "rule" within the APA.55
The Court held that, even if the statement terminating the program would quali-
fy as a "rule," it came within the exemptions contained in section 553 of the
APA - either as a rule of agency organization or as a general statement of
policy.
456
The crucial question on applicability of the APA notice-and-comment
requirements is whether agency acts have the effect of substantive rules; if they
(6th Cir. 1996) (following the Greenwich Collieries holding).
447. Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992). Cf Hadson Gas Systems,
Inc. v. FERC, 75 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (notice and comment not required to abolish obsolete regula-
tions).
448. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988).
449. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993). See also Hoctor v. United States Dep't of Agric., 82
F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996); Tennessee Cable Television Ass'n v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 844
S.W.2d 151, 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
450. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 371 (1989).
451. See Cordero v. Corbisiero, 599 N.E.2d 670 (N.Y. 1992).
452. 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
453. See id. at 189.
454. See id. at 195.
455. See id. at 196.
456. See id. at 197.
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do, they are subject to the requirements even though they are not issued as
substantive rules. Thus, the INS policy of requiring carriers to pay for the de-
tention of stowaways prior to deportation was ruled a legislative rule that had to
be promulgated subject to APA notice-and-comment requirements, though it
was only an agency policy never formally included in any regulation.4 7 The
same was true of the Interior Department's royalty-valuation procedure which
keyed gas product valuations to spot market prices even though it had been set
forth only in an unpublished internal agency paper.4"
The key in these cases is the binding effect of the agency act, regardless of
how it is characterized by the agency. In a D.C. Circuit case, the FCC claimed
that a schedule of base forfeiture amounts for violations of the Communications
Act was a mere "general statement of policy" rather than a legislative rule.459
In rejecting the claim, the court stressed that the schedule was intended "to
cabin [the FCC's] discretion.'" As such, "It simply does not fit the paradigm
of a policy statement, namely, an indication of an agency's current position on
a particular regulatory issue." 1 In effect, then, the alleged "policy statement"
was a "rule in masquerade"; the Commission "has sought to accomplish the
agency hat trick"' to avoid APA notice-and-comment. Even if the schedule
of fines was not a regulation in form, it "was intended to bind, no matter what
'policy statement' clothing it wore. '43
Rulemaking Power
"Administrative law, it is said, has entered an age of rulemaking," in
which, in Justice Scalia's words, "Agency rulemaking powers are the rule rather
than, as they once were, the exception."' It is, however, basic that agencies
do not possess inherent substantive rulemaking power. Where a commission had
issued substantive rules although the legislature had not conferred substantive
rulemaking authority on the agency, the rules were held beyond the
commission's power- "[a] rule is upheld only if the legislative [delegation]
expressly authorizes it."'
The courts have, at the same time, continued their generous approach to
delegations of rulemaking power. 7 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that
agency failure to exercise substantive rulemaking authority for over sixty years
457. See DIA Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1994).
458. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 1994).
459. See United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
460. See id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 1235.
463. Id. See also Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Texas, 784 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1996).
464. William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE LJ. 38, 38 (1975).
465. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE LJ. 511,
516.
466. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 847 F. Supp. 178, 186 (D. Mass. 1994)
(emphasis added).
467. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
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did not affect possession of the power. The agency in question was the NLRB;
"Despite the fact that the NLRB has explicit rulemaking authority,... it has
chosen-unlike any other major agency of the federal government - to make
almost all its policy through adjudication."'  Though it was established in
1935, it was not until 1989 that the NLRB promulgated its first substantive
rule, which was promptly challenged in American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB. 9
The rule defined appropriate collective bargaining units; it provided that, except
for cases presenting "extraordinary circumstances," eight, and only eight, de-
fined employee units were appropriate for collective bargaining in acute care
hospitals.4 '0 The rule was challenged on the ground that the National Labor
Relations Act requires the Board to make a separate bargaining unit detennina-
tion "in each case" and therefore prohibits the Board from using general rules
to define bargaining units.47'
The Court rejected the challenge. According to it, the more natural mean-
ing of the "in each case" requirement is simply to indicate that whenever there
is disagreement about the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, the Board shall
resolve the dispute.4' In doing so, it is entitled to rely on the rules it develops
to guide its discretion either in case-by-case adjudication or by exercise of
rulemaking authority. The governing principle is "that, even if a statutory
scheme requires individualized determinations, the decisionmaker has the au-
thority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability
unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority."4' No
such intent had been expressed here.
Adjudication versus Rulemaking
This aspect of American Hospital brings us to the relation between
rulemaking and adjudication - what I have called "Adjudication versus
Rulemaking."'474 One aspect of that subject was dealt with in Shalala v.
Guernsey Memorial Hospital,475 where it was claimed that an HHS Medicare
reimbursement guideline was void because of failure to issue it in accordance
with APA notice-and-comment provisions. The Court held that the guideline "is
a prototypical example of an interpretive rule 'issued by an agency to advise the
public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it adminis-
ters."'476 That being the case, the failure to follow the APA does not affect
validity: "Interpretive rules do not require notice-and-comment."'
468. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 819 (1990).
469. 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
470. See id. at 606.
471. See id.
472. See id. at 611.
473. Id. at 612.
474. SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 4.18.
475. 115 S. Ct. 1232 (1995).
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The relation of rulemaking to adjudication was also discussed by the
Court, when it noted that the Secretary's regulations did not deal with every
conceivable reimbursement question.47 Instead, as to particular reimbursement
details not addressed by her regulations, the Secretary relied upon an adjudica-
tive structure which includes both administrative and judicial review. That the
regulations did not resolve all reimbursement questions did not render them
invalid.479 The second Chenery case'0 stands for agency discretion in choos-
ing whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication. Hence, "The APA does
not require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by further, more
precise rules rather than by adjudication."'" To the contrary, the Secretary's
mode of determining benefits by both rulemaking and adjudication was wholly
proper.
The Chenery problem is essentially that of retroactive lawmaking by adju-
dication that occurs when an agency decides a case on the basis of a new rule
of law. Should the agency be required to lay down the new rule by rulemaking
and so give fair notice of it in advance? Chenery, of course, answers in the
negative. An agency is not barred from applying a new legal principle in an
adjudicatory proceeding simply because it had the power to announce that prin-
ciple in advance by using its rulemaking power. Thus, retroactive application of
agency rules of law developed through adjudication is not unlawful. Under
Chenery, "agencies have broad legal power to choose between adjudication and
rulemaking proceedings as vehicles for policymaking."'42 In other words, it is
up to the agency to develop its law "either through case-by-case
decisionmaking... or through rule-making." 43
Some courts have, however, refused to follow Chenery, where they have
felt that it leads to unjust results. Foremost among them have been the courts in
Oregon. Their approach is illustrated by Dinkins v. Board of Accountancy,484 a
case in which the agency denied an application for a certified public accountant
certificate. The statute required an applicant to "[h]ave had two years' public
accounting experience or the equivalent thereof satisfactory to the board under
its rules."' The instant applicant had the two years' experience, but the agen-
cy denied her application on the ground that her experience was too "old,"
since it was obtained more than eight years before the application. 4 6 The
cotirt held that the agency had erred because it had no rule when the application
was made on the time that the accounting experience was obtained.' In such
a case, according to the court, the agency was required to have a rule adopted
478. See id. at 1237.
479. See id.
480. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
481. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. at 1237.
482. Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1992).
483. AT&T Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
484. 846 P.2d 1186 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
485. Id. at 1186.
486. See id.
487. See id. at 1186-87.
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under the statute before it might consider the remoteness of petitioner's experi-
ence. 8 The agency might not make that consideration through its order in the
contested application case. Instead, an otherwise permissible agency interpreta-
tion of requirements must be expressed by a duly promulgated rule. 9
Judicial Review
The broad rulemaking power of agencies is now an administrative-law
truism. The Supreme Court has, however, laid down the general proposition
that, absent a specific delegation, retroactive rules will be held ultra vires on
judicial review.' 9 Court review of agency rules is, in general, based upon the
ultra vires doctrine.49 Regulations governing veterans benefits were ruled ultra
vires in Brown v. Gardner" because they were inconsistent with the control-
ling statute. After respondent veteran had back surgery in a Department of
Veterans Affairs facility, he developed pain and weakness, which he alleged
resulted from the surgery.'93 He claimed disability benefits under a statute that
requires compensation for "an injury, or an aggravation of an injury" that oc-
curs "as the result of' VA treatment." 4 The claim was denied on the ground
that a VA regulation covered the injury only if it resulted from negligent VA
treatment. 45 The Court held that the regulation went beyond the statute which
contains not "so much as a word about fault on the part of the VA." '496 In
such a case, the fact that the law was reenacted does not ratify the regulation in
view of the Court's "clear textually grounded conclusion.' '4 Congressional
reenactment has no interpretive effect where a regulation clearly contradicts the
requirements of a statute. "In sum," the Court concludes, "the text and reason-
able inferences from it give it a clear answer against the Government, and that,
as we have said, is 'the end of the matter."'498 Nor did the VA regulatory in-
terpretation deserve deference because of its undisturbed endurance for 60
years. "A regulation's age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a stat-
ute."'49 This is particularly true of VA regulations which have aged so long
because there was no review of VA decisions until 1988.
Review of administrative rules has, like review of other agency action,
been governed by the Chevron doctrine." ° Since the Chevron case itself in-
488. See id. at 1187.
489. But compare Jackson County v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 888 P.2d 98 (Or. CL App.
1995) (Dinkins applies only when statute requires agency to act "under its rules").
490. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp,, 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
491. See SCHWARTz supra note 91, § 4.4. See also Davis County Solid Waste Management v. EPA, 101
F.3d 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rulemaking power limited to authority delegated).
492. 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994).
493. See id. at 554.
494. See id.
495. See id.
496. Id. at 554-55.
497. Id. at 556.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 557.
500. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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volved rulemaking, it is clear that agency rules and regulations are entitled to
Chevron deference. Thus; a regulation classifying annuities according to their
functional characteristics was upheld as "at least reasonable."' Where Con-
gress had not expressed a clear intent and "the administrator's reading fills a
gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable,""5 °e Chevron requires the
regulation to be upheld. That is true, says Judge Easterbrook, "because the
delegation of the power to make substantive regulations is the delegation of a
law-creation power, and interpretation is a vital part of the law-creation pro-
cess.""0 3 The result'is Chevron deference, which upholds the reasonable read-
ing in agency interpretations in regulations. At the same time, the agency "read-
ing must of course be reasonable - must be an interpretation - else the
rulemaker is revising the law."5 's
Chevron was also the foundation for a recent decision 5 upholding a reg-
ulation defining the Endangered Species Act provision that makes it unlawful to
"take" any endangered species to include "significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." The statute defines the
term "take" to include "to harm" and the regulation's interpretation of "harm"
as including indirect injuries such as habitat modification comes within Chev-
ron: "We need not decide whether the statutory definition of 'take' compels the
Secretary's interpretation of 'harm,' because our conclusions that Congress did
not unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt respondents' view and that the
Secretary's interpretation is reasonable suffice to decide this case."5 Chevron
requires "deference to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation. ' '""7
According to Judge Posner, however, review of rules is not the same as
review of legislation itself. The courts, he writes, should not "treat an adminis-
trative rule as courts treat legislation claimed to deny substantive due process,
and thus ask whether on any set of hypothesized facts, whether or not men-
tioned in the statement accompanying the rule, the rule was rational."0" Ac-
cording to Posner, that is not the standard for judicial review of rules:
It is not enough that a rule might be rational; the statement accompanying
its promulgation must show that it is rational - must demonstrate that a
reasonable person upon consideration of all the points urged pro and con
the rule would conclude that it was a reasonable response to a problem
that the agency was charged with solving."°
Judge Posner concluded that the challenged FCC "rules flunk this test":
501. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 817 (1995).
502. Id. at 813.
503. Kurz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 1995).
504. Id.
505. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
506. Id. at 2416.
507. Id.
508. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1992).
509. Id. (emphasis added).
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The Commission's articulation of its grounds is not adequately reasoned.
Key concepts are left unexplained, key evidence is overlooked, arguments
that formerly persuaded the Commission and that time has only
strengthened are ignored, contradictions within and among Commission
decisions are passed over in silence. The impression created is of unprin-
cipled compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity among contending
interest groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants who have somehow
to be conciliated." '
Judicial review of rulemaking power is, without a doubt, an essential part
of our administrative law. What happens, however, if the legislature provides an
administrative remedy for challenges to agency rules? Does such a remedy
deprive the courts of their otherwise inherent jurisdiction to determine the valid-
ity of agency rules and regulations?
These questions were presented in a Florida case where the legislature
provided an administrative remedy for challenging agency rules.5 ' Such chal-
lenges may be initiated by filing petitions seeking determinations of invalidity
of rules with the Division of Administrative Hearings. If a petition to invalidate
a rule is filed with the Division, a hearing officer presides in proceedings that
typically culminate in a final order, which is then reviewable in an appropriate
court. The statute specifically prohibits judicial scrutiny of an administrative
rule to determine whether it constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legisla-
tive authority except to review an order of the Division of Administrative Hear-
ings on a petition challenging a rule filed with it, unless the sole issu& presented
to the court is the rule's constitutionality.
An action was brought by appellants who alleged that they were adversely
affected by rules relocating a coastal construction control line. Appellants at-
tacked the statute providing for administrative review of rules, claiming that its
prohibition of direct judicial review was unconstitutional as a denial of access
to the courts.1 2 The claim was rejected by the Florida court. To require resort
to the administrative remedy as a prerequisite to judicial consideration is not a
denial of access to the courts. "The requirement that appellants pursue an ad-
ministrative remedy that can be fully efficacious and more expeditious, before
resort to the courts, in no way diminishes judicial authority to remedy any
wrong.5 13
In effect, the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement trumps the
otherwise basic right to obtain judicial review of the legality (not only constitu-
tionality) of agency rules. The result is a further diminution of the role of the
courts as ultimate overseers of the rulemaking process. Absent the Florida stat-
ute, a court reviewing an agency rule decides for itself whether the rule is ultra
vires or unreasonable. Now, under the statute, the court can only review the
Division of Administrative Hearings' decision whether the rule constituted an
510. Id. at 1050.
511. See Baillie v. Department of Natural Resources, 632 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
512. See id. at 1118.
513. Id. at 1119.
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invalid exercise of delegated authority - that is, decide only whether the
Division's decision that the rule was or was not reasonable was itself reasonable
- intrinsically a dilution of the normal scope of judicial review over agency
rules and regulations.
AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW
My characterization of judicial review as the "balance wheel of administra-
tive law" ' 4 has been termed "a utopian image" which can be found "only in
Saint Augustine's heavenly city.""5 It is, nevertheless, true that judicial re-
view remains the great safeguard against improper exercises of administrative
authority. Without judicial review, indeed, limitations upon agency power
would only "keep the word of promise to our ear."
Preclusion
Giving effect to the importance of judicial review, the courts have started
with a strong presumption in favor of review.16 Thus, it is settled that the
availability of review does not depend upon statutory review provisions. Judge
Posner has succinctly summarized the law on the matter: "In the federal system,
when no specific method of obtaining judicial review of final orders by admin-
istrative agencies is prescribed by statute, an aggrieved party can still obtain
judicial review, by bringing a declaratory or injunctive suit against the agen-
cy."5 17 In the states, too, there are remedies by which judicial review is se-
cured when review is not provided by statute.'
The judicial posture here may be seen in a 1995 case, where it was
claimed that action of the Attorney General was not subject to review."1 9
Petitioners' complaint alleged damage from an accident in Colombia caused by
a federal employee's negligence.52 ° The U.S. Attorney certified on behalf of
the Attorney General that the employee was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment5 2' Petitioners sought court review of the scope-of-employment cer-
tification. The lower courts held the certification unreviewable. This meant that
petitioners could not recover. In the ordinary case of such a certification, the
United States would be substituted as defendant, and the case would proceed
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. But in this case, substitution would cause
the action's demise: petitioners' claims arose abroad, and thus fell within an
exception to the FTCA. Hence, the lower courts dismissed the suit.
514. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 8.1.
515. WARREN, supra note 429, at 42.
516. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); Timus v. D.C.
Dep't of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751,780 (D.C. 1993).
517. Rekhi v. Wildwood Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 1313, 1320 (7th Cir. 1995).
518. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 9.11.
519. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995).
520. See id. at 2229.
521. See id. at 2230.
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The Supreme Court reversed. The opinion by Justice Ginsburg contains
strong language in favor of review availability. First of all, she writes, "when a
government official's determination of a fact or circumstance - for example,
'scope of employment' - is dispositive of a court controversy, federal courts
generally do not hold the determination unreviewable. Instead, federal judges
traditionally proceed from the 'strong presumption that Congress intends judi-
cial review."'" Nonreviewability "runs up against a mainstay of our system
of government"'  - the rule that no man may be a judge in his own cause.
Here, absent review, "the Attorney General sits as an unreviewable 'judge in
her own cause'; she can block petitioners' way to a tort action in court, at no
cost to the federal treasury."''2 Perhaps the statute may be subject to different
interpretations. Where a fundamental such as judicial review is involved, how-
ever, "we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understandings and
basic principles: that executive determinations generally are subject to judicial
review.
What is the effect, however, of a statutory provision that appears to pre-
clude review - what Judge Posner has called a "door-closing statute"? 26
Even in such a case, it is basic that the door to review is not closed. It is clear,
in the first place, that constitutional claims are not barred by even the strongest
preclusion provisions. A provision making the agency decision "(1) final and
conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact;
and (2) not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a
court by mandamus or otherwise"' was held by the Seventh Circuit not to
"close the door to constitutional claims."'5 The preclusion provision does not
affect the right "to an administrative proceeding uncontaminated by a violation
of the Constitution."29
The Seventh Circuit was only applying the accepted rule in the matter,
recognized most recently by the Supreme Court in Webster v. Doe,50 which
also held that a preclusion statute could not be read to bar review of constitu-
tional claims. The Court stated that it reached its decision in favor of review of
constitutional claims "in part to avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that
would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim."53' Justice Scalia, in a dissent, took issue with
the implication of doubt about the constitutionality of denying all judicial re-
view to a "colorable constitutional claim." '532 According to Scalia, the issue
522. Id. at 2231.
523. Id. at 2233.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 2236.
526. Czerkies v. United States Dep't of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir. 1996).
527. lId at 1437 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8103(b) (1994)).
528. See id. at 1442.
529. Id. at 1443.
530. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
531. Id. at 603.
532. Id. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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here was not denial of all judicial review, but only the denial of review in fed-
eral district courts, and it has long been settled that Congress had complete
control over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 33 One may wonder,
however, whether the Congressional power in this respect may be pushed so far
as to deny any judicial forum for cognizance of constitutional claims.
Justice Scalia states that that problem was not presented in Webster, for
even if Congress had eliminated federal judicial cognizance of constitutional
claims, it had not deprived the state courts of jurisdiction over such claims.534
It is, however, to be feared that Justice Scalia is ignoring the basic principle
that state courts have no jurisdiction over federal officers and agencies.535
Hence, eliminating review in the federal courts means eliminating all review
over a federal agency.
Justice Scalia goes further and denies that judicial review of all "colorable
constitutional claims" arising out of respondent's dismissal may be constitution-
ally required. In fact, Scalia asserts, there is no "general principle that all con-
stitutional violations must be remediable in the courts."536 As Scalia sees it,
not all constitutional claims require a judicial remedy and it is up to Congress
to determine those that do not.
As a general proposition, the Scalia view is constitutional blasphemy.
Congressional power over federal-court jurisdiction should not permit it to go to
the extreme of eliminating all judicial fora for resolution of a constitutional
claim. This is particularly true where review of administrative action is at issue.
To adopt the Scalia view is to give the agency concerned a standing invitation
to disregard the statutory requirements and to exceed the powers conferred. One
can go further and state that a preclusion provision should be interpreted so as
not to bar judicial review on the legality of a challenged administrative act. The
proper approach is shown by a New York case, 37 where the statute provided
that the agency decision "shall be final and conclusive and not subject to further
review in any court." According to the court, nevertheless, "however explicit
the statutory language, judicial review cannot be completely precluded. 535 In
addition to the Webster v. Doe-type review on constitutional issues, "judicial
review is mandated when the agency has acted illegally.., or in excess of its
jurisdiction." 39 The key principle is that stated by the D.C. Circuit: an agency
cannot "expect to escape judicial review by hiding behind a finality clause."5'
The preclusion provision is thus trumped by the requirements of the rule of
law: "Even where judicial review is proscribed by statute, the courts have the
power and the duty to make certain that the administrative official has not acted
533. See id.
534. See id. at 611-12.
535. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
536. Webster, 486 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
537. See New York City Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 579 N.E.2d 1385 (N.Y.
1991).
538. Id. at 1387.
539. Id.
540. Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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in excess of the grant of authority given ... by statute or in disregard of the
standard prescribed by the legislature."54'
King for Four Years?
The Rehnquist Court has been more deferential toward Presidential power
than any Court in recent memory. In two important cases, the Court has gone
far in the direction of insulating Presidential power from judicial reyiew. The
first case, Franklin v. Massachusetts,42 arose out of a challenge to the method
by which Congress apportioned seats in the House of Representatives. Under
the relevant statute, after the Secretary of Commerce takes the census, he re-
ports the tabulation to the President.43 He, in turn, sends Congress a statement
showing the number of persons in each state, based on data from the census,
and he determines the number of Representatives to which each state will be
entitled.5" The Census Bureau allocated federal overseas employees to par-
ticular states for reapportionment purposes in the 1990 census, using an alloca-
tion method that it determined most closely resembled "usual residence," its
standard measure of state affiliation.4 Massachusetts filed an action against
the President and the Secretary of Commerce, alleging that the decision to
allocate the overseas employees was inconsistent with the APA and the Consti-
tution.
The Court held that the action failed to meet the APA requirement of
'"final agency action," which alone is subject to review. 47 In this case, the fi-
nal action complained of was that of the President. The action that creates an
entitlement to a particular number of Representatives and has a direct effect on
the reapportionment is the President's statement to Congress. Hence, there is no
"final" action until the President acts and the fact that the final act was that of
the highest officer was considered by Congress to be "important to the integrity
of the process."
In addition, the Court went on to say that the President's acts, unlike all
other executive and administrative acts, are "not reviewable for abuse of discre-
tion." '49 Even though the Court indicates that Presidential acts may be chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds 50 that still gives the President a unique sta-
tus of immunity, which permits him to violate the law where the violation does
not raise any constitutional issue.
541. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 579 N.E.2d at 1387.
542. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
543. See id. at 797.
544. See id.
545. See id. at 794.
546. See id. at 795.
547. Id. at 796 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994)) (emphasis added).
548. Id. at 800.
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Franklin lays down the rule that Presidential discretion may not be re-
viewed unless a constitutional claim is presented. That raises the question of
how review in the latter case is to be secured. The lower court had granted an
injunction against both the President and the Secretary of Commerce. Franklin
declared, "the District Court's grant of injunctive relief against the President
himself is extraordinary, and should have raised judicial eyebrows.""5 ' But the
lower court injunction did more than raise the Justices' eyebrows. It led them
strongly to reaffirm the over-a-century-old holding that "this Court has no juris-
diction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official du-
ties." '52 More than that, Justice Scalia went out of his way, in a concurrence,
to assert that the same rule applied to issuance of a declaratory judgment
against the President. 53 The President is thus rendered immune from suits for
declaratory or injunctive relief that challenge his performance of executive
functions, even in cases raising constitutional claims. United States v. Nixon
5 4
is thus relegated from its position as a constitutional cause c616bre to one of
legal landmark pass6, which does not affect Presidential immunity in all other
cases.
Franklin tells us that the Nixon case was sui generis and that the Court has
no jurisdiction to order declaratory or injunctive relief against the President in
other cases. The potential implications of this holding may be seen in Franklin
itself. On the merits, the Court held that the inclusion of overseas employees
did not violate the Constitution.555 Suppose, however, that the Court had held
the other way on the constitutional issue. It would still not be able, under its
decision on the matter, to grant any remedy against the President. Since there is
no other effective relief, the result would be unconstitutional executive action
immune from judicial review - ordinarily the very negation of what we mean
by the rule of the law.
Despite this, the Court strongly reaffirmed Franklin in Dalton v. Spec-
ter.556 Dalton arose out of an action to enjoin the Secretary of Defense from
carrying out the President's decision to close the Philadelphia Naval Ship-
yard.557 The court of appeals held that judicial review of the closure decision
was available to ensure that the Secretary and the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission, as participants in the closure selection process, had
complied with the procedural mandates specified by Congress.55 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Franklin required a decision that review was not
available. 59 Here, as in Franklin, the actions of the Secretary and the Com-
mission are not reviewable "final agency actions" within the APA, because their
551. Id. at 802.
552. Id. at 802-03 (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1867)).
553. See id. at 824 (Scalia, J., concurring).
554. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
555. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 806.
556. 114 S. Ct. 1719.(1994).
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reports recommending base closings carry no direct consequences"S Rather,
the action that "will directly affect" bases is taken by the President when he
submits his certificate of approval of the recommendations to Congress.56" ' It is
thus the President, not the Commission, who takes the final action that affects
the military installations.
This holding should have disposed of the case. As in Franklin, however,
the Court did not stop with it. Instead, it once again decided the question of
reviewability of Presidential action. It reaffirmed the Franklin holding that
action of the President may not be reviewed unless a constitutional claim is
presented.562 In Dalton, the claim raised was "a statutory one" - that the
President violated the statute by accepting procedurally flawed recommenda-
tions.563 Hence the Franklin exception for review of constitutional claims did
not apply. "Where a statute, such as the 1990 Act, commits decisionmaking to
the discretion of the President, judicial review of the President's decision is not
available." '
The Franklin-Dalton bottom line is effective immunization of the President
from judicial review. To the assertion that this virtually repudiates Marbury v.
Madison56 and two centuries of constitutional adjudication, the Chief Justice's
opinion of the Court declared, "The judicial power of the United States con-
ferred by Article III of the Constitution is upheld just as surely by withholding
judicial relief where Congress has permissibly foreclosed it, as it is by granting
such relief where authorized by the Constitution or by statute."' " In other
words, judicial abnegation in the face of ultra vires executive action upholds the
rule of law as much as the assertion of the review power delegated by Article
III. Orwell! thou should'st be living at this hour.56
Before the Rehnquist Court, the classic statement of the rule of law was
that in United States v. Lee:5" "No man in this country is so high that he is
above the law .... All the officers of the government, from the highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it." '69 In England, on
the other hand, "the monarch is looked upon with too much reverence to be
subjected to the demands of the law.""57 Under cases such as Franklin and
Dalton, have we now reached the stage stated over a century ago by William H.
Seward, "We elect a king for four years"? 7'
560. See id. at 1724.
561. See id.
562. See id. at 1726-27.
563. See id. at 1727.
564. Id. at 1728.
565. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
566. Dalton, 114S. Ct. at 1728.
567. With apologies to Wordsworth: "Milton! thou should'st be living at this hour: England hath need of
thee." Wordsworth, London (1802).
568. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
569. Id. at 220.
570. Id. at 208.
571. EDWARD S. CORWIN & LOUIS V. KOENIG, THE PRESIDENCY TODAY 61 n.41 (1956) (quoting 1863
statement of William H. Seward).
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Primary Jurisdiction
Two doctrines have been developed to deal with the timing of judicial
review. They are succinctly summarized by Justice Scalia: "Primary jurisdic-
tion... is a doctrine specifically applicable to claims properly cognizable in
court that contain some issue within the special competence of an administrative
agency.""S On the other hand, under the exhaustion rule, "Where relief is
available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to
pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that
recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed."5"
A federal judge tells us that the oft-stated factor - "whether the issues of
fact raised in the case are not within the conventional experience of judges"' 4
- is not determinative on primary jurisdiction: "the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine may be applicable even if the questions raised in a case are within the
ordinary experience of the judiciary."575 Instead, the judicial experience factor
is but one of the four factors upon which application of primary jurisdiction
turns: 1) whether the question raised is within the conventional experience of
judges; 2) whether the question lies peculiarly within the agency's discretion or
requires exercise of administrative expertise; 3) whether there is any danger of
inconsistent rulings; and 4) whether there has been a prior application to the
agency.5
6
Perhaps the most striking primary jurisdiction decision during the decade
was rendered by the California court. The primary jurisdiction doctrine itself is,
of course, one of the foundations of modern administrative law. Yet, in Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court,' Justice Mosk asserts that this
was the first case applying the doctrine in California.578 It is hard to believe
that a developed system of administrative law could function without primary
jurisdiction as a basic principle. Yet Justice Mosk appears to be correct in his
assertion that primary jurisdiction was not a part of his state's administrative
law before 1992. We leave it to California administrative lawyers to explain the
anomaly of a functioning system of administrative law that operated for so
many years without so fundamental a doctrine as primary jurisdiction. At any
rate, in Farmers Insurance Exchange, the California court, however tardily,
adopted the doctrine as an essential part of the state's administrative law.579
Farmers Insurance arose out of an action by the state against insurance
companies for violations of a statutory requirement to offer a Good Driver
Discount Policy. The complaint sought injunctive relief, a civil penalty, and
572. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993).
573. Id.
574. Total Telecommunications. Serv., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 919 F. Supp. 472, 478 (D.D.C. 1996) (quoting
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 496 F.2d 214, 223 (3rd Cir. 1976)).
575. Id.
576. See id.
577. 826 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1992).
578. Id. at 747 (Mask, J., dissenting).
579. See id. at 732.
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"such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.""0 The court held that
prior resort to the administrative process was appropriate. The statute estab-
lished an administrative scheme under which any person aggrieved by any rate
may file a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner, who may determine
whether the statute has been violated and penalize violators."8 ' This was the
administrative remedy which, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, had to be
resorted to before access might be had to the courts. 82
In Fanners Insurance, "considerations of judicial economy, and concerns
for uniformity in application of the complex insurance regulations here in-
volved, strongly militate in favor of a stay to await action by the Insurance
Commissioner in the present case."583 In particular, the decision on whether
the companies had violated the statute mandates the exercise of expertise pre-
sumably possessed by the Insurance Commissioner. There would be "a risk of
inconsistent application of the regulatory statutes if courts are forced to rule on
such matters without benefit of the views of the agency charged with regulating
the insurance industry.""58
On the other hand, "a court would benefit immensely, and uniformity of
decisions would be greatly enhanced, by having an expert administrative analy-
sis available before attempting to grapple with such.., potentially broad-rang-
ing and technical question[s] of insurance law."585 The court concluded that "a
paramount need for specialized agency review militates in favor of imposing a
requirement of prior resort to the administrative process." 86 Hence, the prima-
ry jurisdiction doctrine was applied in California for the first time, though it is
now presumably an established part of California administrative law.
Exhaustion
The Eighth Circuit tells us that primary jurisdiction "is often confused with
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies."" A D.C. Circuit case
illustrates the relationship (and often confusion) between the two doctrines -
what Judge Ginsburg terms the "confluence of concerns about exhaustion and
primary jurisdiction.""58 A district court action was brought against the FCC
challenging the procedure under which the Commission imposed forfeitures for
broadcast of indecent material.589 It was claimed that the Commission violated
the Communications Act by relying on unadjudicated forfeiture orders to in-
crease penalties in later proceedings against the same broadcasters.5 The
580. Id. at 733.
581. See id. at 734.
582. See id. at 743.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 744.
585. Id. at 745.
586. Id. at 746.
587. Jackson v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1452, 1456 (8th Cir. 1995).
588. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
589. See id. at 1252.
590. See id. at 1255.
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court refused to consider the statutory claim, stating that the governing principle
was that the courts should allow an agency to interpret the law before they
determine whether the agency has violated it.59' The parties and the district
court had addressed the question of the court's jurisdiction as the reciprocal of
the Commission's primary jurisdiction. According to Judge Ginsburg, "they
would have been more appropriately concerned with the plaintiffs' failure to
exhaust their administrative remedies."5'
In this case, plaintiffs were "trying to shortcut the administrative pro-
cess," 593 and that was barred by the exhaustion requirement. It was true, the
court conceded, that the case raised a question of first impression for the FCC,
often the case where primary jurisdiction applies.594 However, that did not re-
move it from the ambit of the exhaustion requirement. To the contrary, "the
novelty of the question of statutory interpretation is an additional reason that
the court should allow the administrative process to run its course before taking
the matter into its own hands.""59 At any rate, the proper holding in this case
"is clear: it would be premature for a court to interpret the statute in a void, i.e.,
without the agency itself - as opposed to the lawyers defending the agency in
court - having done so first."59
During the decade, the Supreme Court decided two important exhaustion
cases. The first, McCarthy v. Madigan,5 97 marks a forward step, the second,
Darby v. Cisneros,"9 ' a backward one. McCarthy was a Bivensf" damages
action by a federal prisoner alleging that prison officials "had violated his con-
stitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference
to his needs and medical condition." The lower courts dismissed his com-
plaint on the ground that he had failed to exhaust the Federal Bureau of
Prisons' administrative remedy procedure, rejecting the argument that exhaus-
tion was not required because he sought only money damages, which the Bu-
reau could not provide."' The Supreme Court reversed. The Blackmun opin-
ion stressed the importance of "the exhaustion doctrine [which] recognizes ...
that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the pro-
grams that Congress has charged them to administer."'  Exhaustion enables
the agency "to apply its special expertise" and "acknowledges the commonsense
notion... that an agency ought to have an opportunity to correct its own mis-
takes ... before it is haled into federal court." ' 3
591. See id. at 1257.
592. Id. at 1256.
593. Id.
594. See id. at 1257.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. 503 U.S. 140 (1992).
598. 509 U.S. 137 (1993).
599. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
600. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 142.
601. Id. at 144.
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However, Justice Blacknun tells us, the Court has recognized exceptions
to exhaustion in cases where "the litigant's interests in immediate judicial re-
view outweigh the government's interests in efficiency or administrative autono-
my. '6 4 According to the Blackmun opinion, there are three such exceptions:
(1) Where "requiring resort to the administrative remedy may occasion undue
prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action."'' s An example is where
there is "an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action."'
(2) Where there is "some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to
grant effective relief.".This exception arises where the "agency... may be
unable to consider whether to grant relief because it lacks institutional compe-
tence to resolve the particular type of issue presented, such as the constitution-
ality of a statute""8 or the adequacy of the' agency procedure itself, or where
the agency, though "competent to adjudicate the issue presented... lack[s]
authority to grant the type of relief requested."' (3) "[W]here the adminis-
trative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue
before it. 6
10
In effect, these are cases in which the agency remedy is inadequate. Such
inadequacy existed in McCarthy for plaintiff's claim for money damages. The
absence of any monetary remedy in the administrative procedures weighed
heavily against imposing an exhaustion requirement. As the Chief Justice suc-
cinctly put it in a concurrence, "in cases such as this one where prisoners seek
monetary relief, the Bureau's administrative remedy furnishes no effective rem-
edy at all, and it is therefore improper to impose an exhaustion re-
quirement. '6 1
Few, it is believed, will disagree with the McCarthy exhaustion holding.
An agency remedy can scarcely be adequate if it cannot provide the remedy
plaintiff seeks. There are, however, broader implications for the timing of re-
view in the Court's decision. According to it, lack of agency power to award
money damages is enough to allow access to the courts even though the admin-
istrative process has not been exhausted.6 1 If this is true of the requirement of
exhaustion of agency remedies, why is it not also true of the primary jurisdic-
tion requirement of first-instance resort to the administrative process? If that
result follows, it will make for an important change in the federal law of judi-
cial review. The federal courts have refused to read an exception into the prima-
ry jurisdiction doctrine "even if the [agency] has no power to award damages or
604. Id. at 146.
605. Id. at 146-47.
606. Id. at 147.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 147-48. Compare Horrell v. Department of Admin., 861 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Colo. 1993) (hold-
ing exhaustion not required when agency lacks authority to decide issue raised).
609. Id. at 148.
610. Id.
611. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 156 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). See also General Atomics v. NRC, 75 F.3d
536 (9th Cir. 1996) (no exhaustion exception because of costs of appearing before agency).
612. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 149.
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otherwise grant the relief sought."" 3 McCarthy may foreshadow a change in
this rule that will make for an exception to the primary jurisdiction requirement
where the agency is powerless to grant the relief requested.
Yet, if McCarthy thus represents a forward step, the same is not true of
Darby v. Cisneiros,614 the Court's other important exhaustion decision. Darby
arose out of a Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) proceed-
ing to debar petitioners from participating in federal programs. A hearing was
held before an ALl who issued an initial decision debarring petitioners for 18
months.6"5 Under HUD regulations, any party may request a review of the
hearing officer's determination."6 Petitioners did not seek review of the AL's
initial decision, but instead filed suit, claiming that the sanction imposed was
not in accordance with law within the meaning of section 10(e) of the APA." 7
HUD moved to dismiss on the ground that petitioners had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. 8
Darby appears to present the classic Sing Tuck"9 type of case calling for
simple application of the exhaustion rule. If there has been a decision in the
agency that is subject to an appeal within the administrative hierarchy, the well-
established rule has been that, so long as there is a legal right to appeal, access
to the courts is not available until after the appellate agency remedy has been
exhausted. The courts should not permit premature interruption of the adminis-
trative process by intervening before the final decision at the highest agency
level.62
This is elementary exhaustion doctrine, but Darby held that it is inapplica-
ble to review actions brought under the APA.62 That is true, the Court stated,
because of the last sentence in section 10(c) of the APA.6' That provision,
the Court said, "by its very terms, has limited the availability of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies to that which the statute or rule clearly
mandates."'6 Indeed, asserted the opinion, "the last sentence of § 10(c) would
make no sense" if courts imposed additional exhaustion requirements beyond
those provided by Congress or the agency.624 As the Court saw it, "Section
613. ICC v. Baltimore & Annapolis R.R. Co., 398 F. Supp. 454, 468 (D. Md. 1975). See also SCHWARtZ,
supra note 91, § 8.30.
614. 509 U.S. 137 (1993).
615. See id. at 141.
616. See id. (citing 24 C.F.R. § 24.314(c) (1992)).
617. See id. at 142.
618. See id.
619. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
620. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 8.30. For a recent statement of the reasons for the exhaustion doc-
trine, see N.B. ex rel. D.G. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
621. See Darby, 509 U.S. at 146.
622. See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994)). The last sentence of § 704 provides:
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the pur-
poses of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a de-
claratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and
provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
623. Darby, 509 U.S. at 146.
624. id. at 147.
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10(c) explicitly requires exhaustion of all intra-agency appeals mandated either
by statute or by agency rule; it would be inconsistent with the plain language of
§ 10(c) for courts to require litigants to exhaust optional appeals as well."'
The result is that, in actions brought under the APA, "an appeal to 'superi-
or agency authority' is a prerequisite to judicial review only when expressly
required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review and
the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review." What
Darby means, the Second Circuit explains, is "that federal courts do not have
the authority to require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review under the APA, where neither the relevant statute nor
agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial re-
view." Unless a statute or rule expressly requires it, exhaustion is not a pre-
requisite to nonstatutory review actions (since all such actions can be framed in
terms of APA review actions). This removes a major part of judicial review
cases from any exhaustion requirement. All that the courts have said about the
compelling reasons for the exhaustion requirement - that it is both an expres-
sion of administrative autonomy and a rule of sound judicial administration
militate against the Darby gutting of that requirement.
The practical effect of Darby will be a proliferation of appeals from AU
decisions by agencies themselves. If they do not take such appeals on their own
motion, Darby tells them that parties who lose at the AIJ stage can go directly
into court. That would make the ALJs the final deciders, which would make it
difficult for the agency heads to ensure conformity with their policies in the
agency decision process. The alternative is for the agencies to provide in their
rules for mandatory appeals - a result inconsistent with the APA's intent to
elevate the ALJ to the status of an administrative trial judge.
Standing
Justice Brennan urged that the sole test for standing should be injury in
facts But he spoke in dissent. As more recently explained by the Court, it
has adopted a bipartite test, with a second prong that amounts to an additional
gloss on standing law.629 "The Court supplied this gloss by adding to the re-
quirement that the complainant be 'adversely affected or aggrieved.' i.e., injured
in fact, the additional requirement that 'the interest sought to be protected by
the complainant [be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'6 30 In the case
in which this statement was made, a trade association of securities brokers
brought an action challenging the Comptroller of the Currency's approval of
625. Id.
626. Id. at 154.
627. Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995).
628. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 172 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
629. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
630. Id. at 395-96 (qutoing Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153).
[Vol. 32:493
68
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/10
A DECADE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
national bank applications for the establishment of discount securities brokerage
offices.63 In this case, both prongs of the Court's bipartite standing test were
met: the plaintiff not only suffered actual injury, but suffered injury from the
competition that Congress had arguably legislated against by limiting national
banks' permitted activities.632
Though the second standing prong was thus satisfied in the case, that
prong does impose an additional restriction which may bar standing even where
plaintiff shows injury in fact. This is shown by Air Courier Conference of
America v. American Postal Workers Union.63  Acting under the Private Ex-
press Statutes (PES), the Postal Service had issued regulations suspending its
monopoly over carriage of letters to allow private couriers to deposit with for-
eign postal services letters destined for foreign addresses.634 Postal workers'
unions brought an action challenging the adequacy of the rulemaking re-
cord.6 35 The Court ruled that the unions did not have standing.3 6 It did not
challenge the finding that the unions had satisfied the injury-in-fact test because
increased competition through international remailing services could have an
adverse effect on postal workers' employment opportunities. Under the two-
prong standing approach followed by the Court, the question then became
whether the adverse effects on the employment opportunities fell within the
zone of interests protected by PES. That question was answered in the nega-
tive.637 In enacting PES, the Court stated, Congress was concerned not with
protecting postal employment, but with the receipt of necessary Postal Service
revenues.63 The PES enables the Service to fulfill its responsibilities to pro-
vide service to all communities at a uniform rate by preventing private couriers
from competing selectively on the Service's most profitable routes. The monop-
oly, therefore, exists to protect the citizenry at-large, not postal workers.639
One may, nevertheless, wonder whether the Court's standing approach is
not too narrow. After all, as a federal judge points out:
The APA standing section, 5 U.S.C. § 702, does not contain a "zone of
interests" test. The Supreme Court supplied this gloss as a means of im-
plementing what it described as Congress' intent to broaden remedies, but
not to allow suit by every person suffering injury in fact.... How Con-
gress indicated this intention, not found in the language of the statute, has
not been disclosed. So much for plain meaning when the shoe is on the
other foot."
631. See id. at 392.
632. See id. at 403.
633. 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
634. See id. at 519-20.
635. See id. at 520.
636. See id. at 530.
637. See id. at 529-30.
638. See id. at 528.
639. See id.
640. NRDC v. Patterson, 791 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 & n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
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The purpose of the standing requirement is to ensure that there is a real
"case" or "controversy" brought by a plaintiff who has a direct interest in the
challenged agency act. That purpose is met where the plaintiff has suffered
harm from the challenged act. In addition, Air Courier Conference presents an
important factor that should make for a more liberal standing approach. If the
postal workers are barred from bringing the review action, who would have
standing to challenge the allegedly illegal agency act? One must conclude, with
one commentator, that, "in Air Courier Conference, the Court used standing
doctrine to prevent highly interested plaintiffs from challenging regulations that
threatened their livelihood.""'
Statutory Standing
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 2 even the Brennan injury-in-fact test
was not met. The Endangered Species Act divides responsibilities for endan-
gered species protection between the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce.
The Act requires each to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by [an] agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence [or
habitat] of any endangered.., or threatened species."'  The Secretaries pro-
mulgated a joint regulation extending the Act's coverage to actions in foreign
nations, but a subsequent joint rule limited the section's geographic scope to the
United States and the high seas." Respondents - wildlife conservation and
other environmental organizations - filed an action for declaratory judgment
that the new regulation erred on the Act's geographic scope and "an injunction
requiring the Secretary [of the Interior] to promulgate a new regulation restoring
the initial interpretation."'
The Court held that the action must be dismissed for lack of standing.
Respondents had failed to demonstrate that they suffered an injury in fact. The
desire to use or observe an animal species may be a cognizable interest for
purpose of standing, but "the 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to
a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among
the injured."' Respondents failed to show "through specific facts, not only
that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but
also that one or more of respondents' members would thereby be 'directly'
affected."' 7 Affidavits of members claiming an intent to revisit project sites at
some future time, at which they would presumably be denied opportunity to
observe endangered animals, do not suffice, for they do not demonstrate any
"imminent" injury.64
641. Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 452.
642. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
643. Id. at 558 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994)).
644. See id. at 558-59.
645. Id. at 559.
646. Id. at 563.
647. Id. at 563.
648. See id. at 564.
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Respondents had also raised what the Court calls "a series of novel stand-
ing theories." '6 9 These theories were the "animal nexus" approach, under
which anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals
anywhere has standing, 5' and the "vocational nexus" approach, under which
anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue."' These theories,
however, pushed the concept of standing beyond reasonable bounds. Under
respondents' theories, any person using any part of *a contiguous ecosystem
adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is locat-
ed far away from the area of their use. This would mean that "anyone who goes
to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian
elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of the
Agency for International Development (AID) did not consult with the Secretary
regarding the AID-funded project in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason." ' 2
Indeed, the Court declares, it is "pure speculation and fantasy, to say that any-
one who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world,
is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species
with which he has no more specific connection."653 Or, as the Chief Justice
strikingly expressed it during the oral argument: "This is beginnifig to sound
like the 'House That Jack Built.' We're talking about the secretary of the interi-
or and World Bank contributions to something in Thailand. There seems to be
so much distance." '6 4
For our purposes, Lujan is even more important because it holds, for the
first time, that there may be limits upon statutory standing. Despite the constitu-
tional basis of the standing requirement, it has been generally assumed that
Congress may provide for standing in a person or class where none would
otherwise exist. In such a case, as Justice Harlan once put it, the private liti-
gants whom Congress permitted to bring the review action "acting as private
attorneys-general, may have standing as 'representatives of the public inter-
est,"'' s despite their lack of economic or other personal interests. The Lujan
opinion indicates, however, that the "private attorneys-general" theory may
itself be subject to Article 11 limitations.656 The court of appeals had held that
respondents had standing on the ground that the statute's citizen-suit provision
confers on all persons the right to challenge the Secretary's action, notwith-
standing their inability to allege any separate concrete injury from that failure.
The Court ruled that this was error. The opinion notes that the cases have con-
sistently ruled that a plaintiff claiming only a generally available grievance
649. Id. at 565.
650. See id. at 566.
651. See id. at
652. Id. at 566.
653. Id. at 567.
654. Oral Argument, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 60 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 7, 1992).
655. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
656. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580.
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about government, unconnected with a threatened concrete interest of his own,
does not state an Article I case or controversy. 7
Lujan indicates that Congress may not confer standing in such a general-
ized grievance case. As the Court sees it, "[v]indicating the public interest...
is the function of the Congress and the Chief Executive."" 8 To allow that in-
terest to be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as
such and to permit all citizens to sue, regardless of whether they suffered any
distinctive harm, would authorize "Congress to transfer from the President to
the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'
' ' 9
One need not agree with this justification to agree with the result. As more
pithily summarized in a concurrence by Justice Kennedy, Lujan holds that
there is an outer limit to the power of Congress to confer rights of action
[that] is a direct and necessary consequence of the case and controversy
limitations found in Article I.... [I]t would exceed those limitations if,
at the behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing of concrete
injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.'
This means that, even in statutory standing cases, "the concrete injury require-
ment must remain.""' Even where Congress provides for citizen standing,
"the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and
personal way." 62
Ripeness
The requirement of ripeness for review has been explained by the Ninth
Circuit:
Under the ripeness doctrine, an agency must have taken "final" action
before judicial review is appropriate.... Indicia of finality include: the
administrative action challenged should be a definitive statement of an
agency's position; the action should have a direct and immediate effect on
the day-to-day business of the complaining parties; the action should have
the status of law; immediate compliance with the terms should be expect-
ed; and the question should be a legal one."63
Where the challenged administrative act does not have immediate adverse ef-
fect, it is not ripe for review. Thus, a public utilities commission decision that a
company was a public utility subject to the commission's jurisdiction was not
657. See id. at 576.
658. Id. at 576.
659. Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
660. Id. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
661. Id. at 578.
662. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
663. Mt. Adams Veneer Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ripe; further action would have to be taken for there to be adverse impact upon
the company.'
The courts have continued to follow the ripeness test laid down in the
leading Abbott Laboratories case.' 6 In another case, the Ninth Circuit ex-
plains the two elements in that test: "The fitness element requires that the issue
be primarily legal, need no further factual development, and involve a final
agency action.... To meet the hardship requirement, a party must show that
withholding judicial review would result in direct and immediate hardship and
would entail more than possible financial loss."6" The case before the Ninth
Circuit involved a challenge to an FDA regulatory letter that a dietary supple-
ment co-enzyme was an unapproved food additive. The court held that the
informal letter did not meet the ripeness test. In the first place, the issue was
not primarily legal, since it needed agency factual determination applied to
plaintiff's particular product. 7 In addition, plaintiff had not shown that with-
holding review would result in direct and immediate hardship."8 The risk of
seizures and injunction actions were found "too speculative to warrant judicial
intervention." ' 9 At most, there was only potential financial loss which was
not sufficient hardship to require bypassing final agency action.
In Reno v. Catholic Social Services,67 the Supreme Court imposed an
important limitation upon the Abbott Laboratories test. A law created an alien
legalization program, under which an alien unlawfully in the United States
could apply for resident status by showing continuous residence in this country
since 1982V 7 The INS issued regulations providing that "brief, casual, and
innocent absences" from the United States would not break the required conti-
nuity.6' However, the INS stated that it would consider an absence "brief,
casual, and innocent" only if the alien had obtained INS permission, known as
"advance parole," before leaving the country.67 Plaintiffs brought a class ac-
tion challenging the advance parole regulations.
The key question in Catholic Social Services, according to Justice Souter's
opinion of the Court, was ripeness, said to be drawn both from Article I limi-
tations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise
jurisdiction.674 The Court conceded that a statutory source of jurisdiction was
not lacking. Nor was it fatal that the Reform Act was silent about judicial
review. Here, the opinion reaffirmed the Stark v. Wickard76 rule that legisla-
664. See Keystone v. Flynn, 769 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1989).
665. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
666. Dietary Supplemental Coalition, Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
667. See id. at 562-63.
668. See id. at 564.
669. Id.
670. 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
671. See id. at 50.
672. See id. at 47.
673. See id.
674. See id. at 58.
675. See id. at 56.
676. 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
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tive silence is not to be construed "as a denial of authority to [an] aggrieved
person to seek appropriate relief in the federal courts."6' Indeed, Justice
Souter affirmed, the Stark v. Wickard rule has been reinforced by enactment of
the APA, with its basic presumption of judicial review. 8
The presumption of review may, nevertheless, be overcome where the
ripeness requirement is not met. Abbott Laboratories indicated that the promul-
gation of a regulation may itself affect parties concretely enough to satisfy the
requirement.6 79 But that was true because the Abbott Laboratories regulations
presented plaintiffs with an immediate dilemma - to choose between comply-
ing or risking penalties for violation. Other cases indicate that this is not true of
all regulations; in some cases, the regulation may not be ripe for review until it
has been applied to the plaintiff by some concrete action." ° In the Court's
view, the INS regulations "fall on the latter side of the line.' 61' As Justice
Souter put it, "They impose no penalties for violating any newly imposed re-
striction, but limit access to a benefit created by the Reform Act but not auto-
matically bestowed on eligible aliens." An alien desiring the benefit had to
take further steps-namely to apply for resident status. "In these circumstances,
the promulgation of the challenged regulations did not itself give each [alien] a
ripe claim; a... claim would ripen only once he took the affirmative steps that




Catholic Social Services distinguishes, for ripeness purposes, between a
duty-creating rule and a benefit-conferring rule. The Court held that the Abbott
Laboratories ripeness approach does not apply to a benefit-conferring rule, but
only to a duty-creating rule.6" The difference between the two types, so far as
ripeness is concerned, was explained by Justice O'Connor: "Even if he succeeds
in his anticipatory action, the would-be-beneficiary will not receive the benefit
until he actually applies for it; and the agency might then deny him the benefit
on grounds other than his ineligibility under the rule. By contrast, a successful
suit against the duty-creating. rule will relieve the plaintiff immediately of a
burden that he otherwise would bear." '
Under Catholic Social Services, an action challenging a benefit-conferring
rule is unripe where the plaintiff has not applied for the benefit. But that is
inconsistent with Abbott Laboratories, under which a rule is subject to immedi-
ate review - even before it is applied in a specific case - if it has an immedi-
ate adverse effect by imposing a burden upon plaintiff. The same should be true
of a benefit-conferring rule, where its effect will be to deny the benefit should
677. Catholic Soc. Serv., 509 U.S. at 56.
678. See id. at 57.
679. See id.
680. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. . v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 165 (1967).
681. Catholic Soc. Serv., 509 U.S. at 58.
682. Id. at 58.
683. Id. at 59.
684. See id. at 70.
685. Id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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plaintiff apply for it. This does not mean that a benefit-conferring rule is auto-
matically subject to anticipatory challenge. The key ripeness requirement of
adverse effect would still have to be met. But that does not justify a categorical
rule that would-be beneficiaries cannot challenge benefit-conferring regulations
until they apply for benefits. Catholic Social Services should be considered an
aberration that is inconsistent with the trend toward ripeness relaxation that has
characterized our administrative law. 6
Criminal Enforcement
Administrative lawyers have been concerned by the lacuna in the law of
review created by Yakus v. United States,6s' where the Court found an impor-
tant exception to the basic principle that one criminally charged with violating
an administrative order may raise the order's invalidity is a defense. Unlike
other criminals, the defendant whose crime resulted from the violation of an
administrative order could be convicted on what amounted to a trial in two
parts or, in the alternative, a trial which shut out what might be the most impor-
tant of the issues material to guilt.68
Yakus has been questioned in two cases decided during the decade. The
first was United States v. Mendoza-Lopez.6"9 Respondents had been prosecuted
for violating a statute making entry by an alien who had been deported a felo-
ny. They moved to dismiss on the ground that they had been denied fair depor-
tation hearings. The Court held that respondents could challenge their previous
deportation orders as a defense to the prosecutions. That Congress did not in-
tend the deportation order to be contestable in the subsequent prosecution was
not determinative. 61 Where the defects in an administrative proceeding fore-
closed judicial review, an alternate means of review had to be made available
before the administrative order might establish conclusively an element of a
criminal offense."9 In this case the lack of fair deportation procedures meant
that respondents' waivers of their appeal rights were not intelligent and this
"amounted to a complete deprivation of judicial review." '692 Because of this,
the deportation proceeding could not be used to support a criminal conviction.
Justice Marshall, who delivered the Mendoza-Lopez opinion, went even
further in a 1991 concurrence and indicated that, despite Yakus, review in the
criminal enforcement proceeding is a constitutional necessity. In Touby v. Unit-
ed States,693 the Attorney General was given power to schedule controlled
substances upon a temporary basis, which subjected those manufacturing the
drugs to prosecution. The statute provided that a temporary scheduling order
686. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, §§ 9.4-9.5.
687. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
688. See id. at 478.
689. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
690. See id. at 837.
691. See id. at 838.
692. Id. at 840.
693. 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
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was not subject to judicial review. It was argued that the review bar was inval-
id. The Court answered this argument by stressing that, since the statute autho-
rizes judicial review of a permanent scheduling order, the effect of the bar is
merely to postpone legal challenges to a scheduling order until the administra-
tive process has run its course.694 What makes Touby pertinent to the Yakus
issue was the Court's statement that the statutory review bar did not preclude an
individual facing criminal charges from bringing a challenge to a temporary
scheduling order as a defense to prosecution.6
Justice Marshall dealt specifically with this point in his concurrence. "Be-
cause of the severe impact of criminal laws on individual liberty," Marshall
declared, "I believe that an opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker's
compliance with congressional directives is a constitutional necessity when
administrative standards are enforced by criminal law."'6 Hence the instant
statute must be read as "preserving judicial review of a temporary scheduling
order in the course of a criminal prosecution in order to save the Act's delega-
tion of lawmaking power from unconstitutionality." 6" Despite Yakus, "the use
of the result of an administrative proceeding to establish an element of a crimi-
nal offense is troubling." '698 In Justice Black's phrase years ago, there is still
no satisfactory answer to the view that the Constitution bars insulation of an
agency order from review in a prosecution for its violation.6" To the contrary,
"a requirement in a criminal case that the defendant challenge administratively
the validity of administrative rules would impinge on his right[s]. '7 °
SCOPE OF REVIEW
Chevron Doctrine
The scope of judicial review during the past decade has largely turned
upon application of the Chevron doctrine."' It is, however, amazing how fre-
quently administrative lawyers find it necessary to reinvent the wheel. A few
years ago, Attorney General Meese made the "discovery" that the independent
agency violated the separation of powers7° - an issue that had been fully
discussed and decided years earlier in the passage of the FTC Act and the
Humphrey case.7" Now Chevron has suddenly become the doctrine of the
hour. Justice Scalia has proclaimed Chevron the most important administrative
694. See id. at 161.
695. See id. at 168.
696. Id. at 170 (Marshall, J., concurring).
697. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). See also United States v. Meza-Soria, 935 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding deportation order not conclusive proof of alienage in criminal proceeding).
698. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839 n.15.
699. See United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 174 n.2 (1952).
700. State v. Berger, 605 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
701. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
702. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
703. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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law decision in recent years.7° But as Judge Starr points out, Chevron is real-
ly only a reprise of the doctrine applied "[a] generation ago in the landmark
case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications."7 5 Yet, though Chevron may only sup-
ply a new rubric for Hearst, it is treated by both judges and the Bar as a new
administrative law revelation.
The Supreme Court has summed up Chevron as follows: "Under Chev-
ron.., if a statute is unambiguous the statute governs; if, however, Congress'
silence or ambiguity has 'left a gap for the agency to fill,' courts must defer to
the agency's interpretation .... " The Ninth Circuit points out that, under
Chevron, "[]udicial review of an agency's construction of a statute that it ad-
ministers is a two-part process."'  Another opinion contains a more detailed
explanation of the Chevron doctrine:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute the agency has
been entrusted to administer, the court's analysis is two-fold. If Congress
has spoken to the precise question at issue, the analysis is complete. This
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress (Chevron Prong I).... But where, as here, the
court determines that Congress has not spoken directly to the issue, the
court may not impose its own construction of the statute. Rather, the
court's analysis is limited to whether the agency's construction of the
statute was permissible.... Since the agency was vested with policy-
making power, it is authorized to fill in the gaps that may have been left
by Congress and this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.... unless the court finds the agency's construction inconsistent
with the statutory mandate or that it frustrates the purpose of Congress
(Chevron Prong I1H).7
Chevron thus has two prongs. Prong I requires the court to determine
whether the statute is ambiguous; if it is, "Chevron requires that we defer to an
agency's interpretation of its organic statute once we determine that that statute
is ambiguous."7°  Prong II requires the court "to determine whether the
agency's interpretation is 'permissible,' that is to say, reasonable;"7 "0 if it is,
Chevron deference demands affirmance of the agency construction.
The first step in applying Chevron is to determine whether the relevant
statute is unambiguous. If it is, there is no room for the deference doctrine. A
statute is plainly not ambiguous where it has been given a specific interpretation
by the Supreme Court. That is true even though the interpretation in question
was contained in a decision rendered more than eighty years ago.7"' Judicial
704. See Scalia, supra note 465, at 512.
705. Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)).
706. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993).
707. Valenzuela v. Yeutter, 988 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1993).
708. Sierra Club v. Davies, 955 F.2d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1992).
709. Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, I., dissenting).
710. Maislin Indus. U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990). For an agency interpretation
that conflicts with a recent Supreme Court precedent, see Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996).
711. See Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 130.
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interpretation eliminates the statutory ambiguity and makes Chevron deference
inappropriate regardless of the time lag between the decision and the challenged
agency action."' On the other hand, if the statute is not unambiguous, Chev-
ron deference requires the courts to allow the agency decisionmaker a range of
discretion limited only by the reasonableness test. Agency interpretation must
be upheld if it is reasonable, even if not necessarily the same construction that
the reviewing court would have adopted on its own independent judgment.
Chevron deference may require a reviewing court to uphold an agency
decision with which it strongly disagrees. In ABF Freight System, Inc. v.
NLRB,' an employee fired for tardiness filed an unfair labor practice charge.
The ALJ concluded that the employee had lied when he testified that car trou-
ble had made him late to work and found that he had been dismissed for
cause." 4 The Board reversed. Though it agreed that the employee had lied, it
found that the real reason for the discharge was his union activities."5 Though
the Court indicated that, if it had been the tribunal of first instance, it might
have decided that the false testimony disqualified the employee from profiting,
the Court held that the Board had the discretion to decide otherwise.' Citing
Chevron, the Court said, "When Congress expressly delegates to an administra-
tive agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts must
give the agency's decision controlling weight unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.""' In such a case, "the Board's views
merit the greatest deference. '
Perhaps the deference doctrine requires the courts to sustain even what
Justice Scalia calls "unintelligent (but nonetheless lawful) executive action."7 9
But should the same be true where the agency exercise of discretion relates to
the very integrity of the administrative process? To Justice Scalia, the agency's
action was not "eminently reasonable." On the contrary, "it is at the very
precipice of the tolerable."' Yet even Scalia did not vote for reversal, indi-
cating that the Board could "decide 'to rely on "other civil and criminal reme-,
dies" for false testimony."' 'm Does the Justice really believe that there is the
slightest chance for prosecution of an employee who lied about his lateness for
work in an NLRB hearing, particularly where the Board decided in his favor?
Chevron deference may even go so far as to apply when the agency gives
a statutory term a meaning different from that in any dictionary. In Smiley v.
Citibank (South Dakota), NA., ' an 1864 federal statute provided that a na-
712. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
713. 510 U.S. 317 (1994).
714. See id. at 319.
715. See id. at 320.
716. See id. at 325.
717. Id. at 324.
718. Id.
719. Id. at 326 (Scalia, J., concurring).
720. Id. at 329.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 331.
723. 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
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tional bank may charge its loan customers "interest at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State... where the bank is located." 4 The Comptroller of the
Currency issued a regulation that included flat late feesm that banks charged
credit card holders in the definition of "interest." This is contrary to the mean-
ing of the word in every dictionary, in which "interest" is uniformly defined as
"Money paid for the use of money lent (the principal), or for forbearance of a
debt, according to a fixed ratio (rate per cent)" - a meaning that it has had
since a statute of Henry VIII.m Despite this, the Court held that Chevron def-
erence required the Comptroller's interpretation to be upheld as a reasonable
one. One may doubt that the Chevron Prong I requirement of ambiguity is satis-
fied when a statute uses a term with so consistent a meaning only because there
was a lower-court "conflict that has prompted us to take this case." But it is
the Court's application of Chevron Prong II that gives one the most pause.
Under Prong II, Smiley states, "the question before us is not whether it repre-
sents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable
one. The answer is obviously yes." 9
724. Id. at 1732 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)).
725. For one credit card held by petitioner, $15 was charged for failure to make minimum monthly pay-
ments within 25 days of due date; for a second card, $6 for payment not made with 15 days, and additional
charge of the greater of $15 or 0.65% of balance if payment was not made by next monthly payment due
date. See id. at 1732.
726. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcIoNARY 394 (1970). See also WEBSTER'S TiRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1178 (1981); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 993 (1987).
727. "Be it also enacted ... that no person ... by way or means of any corrupte bargain, loone... inter-
est... accept or take.., above the sume of ten pounds in the hundred. 37 Henry VIII, c.9, § 3 (1545)."
OXFORD, supra note 726. According to OXFORD, "Interest in the modem sense was first sanctioned by law" in
this statute. Id.
728. Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1732.
729. Id. at 1735. It is not my practice to nit-pick Supreme Court opinions, but I was intrigued by Smiley's
citation of contemporary law dictionaries and a Supreme Court opinion to support the Comptroller's defini-
tion. The authorities cited by the Court do not really support its decision. It quotes the definition in Brown v.
Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1873) - "Interest is the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the
parties, for the use or forbearance of money or as damages for its detention .... - but neglects to point out
that this statement was made with reference to a loan that called for "interest at the rate of twenty per cent a
year." Id. at 178. Similarly, the law dictionaries cited do not support the decision. Thus, the quote from JOHN
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 652 (6th ed. 1856), the standard American law dictionary of its day, according to
JULUS MAXKE, A CATALOGUE OF THE LAw COLLECION AT NEw YORK UNIVERSITY 1201 (1953), is similar
to that in Brown v. Hiatts, but again the opinion does not mention that in its discussion of how interest is
computed. BouvIER makes reference only to interest as a percentage of principal. In particular it lists the rate
of interest allowed in the different states, all stated in percentage terms. See BOUVIER, supra, at 656-58.
BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY and THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, both cited by the Court, contain general defi-
nitions similar to that in BOUVIER; but that alone scarcely endorses the Smiley definition - - particularly since
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW also later lists the rate allowed in the different states as only a percentage of
principal. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra, at 411-13. More important is the fact that the leading
English law dictionary of the day defined "interest' as the "rate per cent." See J. WHARTON, LAW LEXICON
OR DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE 391 (2d Am. ed. 1860) (cited as "But see" in Smiley, 116 S. Ct at 1735).
Also the leading dictionary when the federal statute was passed defined "interest" as "Premium paid for the
use of money; the profit per cent derived from money lent." NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 615 (1856 ed.). Even if, as Smiley notes, some courts have defined "interest" the
way the Comptroller of the Currency does, that alone does not make his definition reasonable, contrary as it is
to all the dictionary meanings of the word. After all, as Lincoln once put it, "If you call a tail a leg, how
many legs has a dog? Five? No; calling a tail a leg don't make it a leg." BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
458 (Morley ed. 1951). To the contrary, if the Supreme Court calls a tail a leg, the tail apparently does be-
come a leg.
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To the contrary, what the agency did here calls to mind a statement some
years ago by the Chief Justice: "[Congress] did not empower the Administrator
[to act] after the manner of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking
Glass" ° and make a word mean "just what I choose it to mean." '73 It is
hard to support an interpretation of Chevron that would require the courts to
uphold an agency that follows the Lewis Carroll method. Of course, the broader
question in our public law is another Humpty Dumpty query: "The question
is ... which is to be master - that's all"732 - the agency or the law?
Chevron Expansion
The Chevron case involved review of rulemaking and, strictly speaking, its
doctrine of deference governs only review of regulations. Yet Chevron, like the
power of which Madison speaks,7 3 has also proved to be of an encroaching
nature. The cases during the decade indicate that Chevron cannot be limited to
review of regulations alone. Instead, the Chevron doctrine applies to review of
all statutory interpretation by agencies - whether the agency has exercised a
legislative or judicial function. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit, "[W]e
review with deference an agency's interpretation of the statute that it has re-
sponsibility to enforce, whether that interpretation emerges from an adjudicative
proceeding or administrative rulemaking." 734
Thus, all review of statutory interpretations by an agency - whether in a
rule or adjudicatory decision - is governed by Chevron deference. A D.C.
Circuit case supports what has just been said. According to it, a court is re-
quired to give deference to an agency's reading of a settlement agreement even
where the issue only involves the proper construction of language.7 35 Accord-
ing to Judge Bork's opinion, this conclusion is required by Chevron, which
rejected the view that a court may fully review an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion. Judge Bork notes that the construction of a statute has always been consid-
ered a "pure" question of law. 6 Despite this, Chevron held that, unless it is
clear that Congress had directly addressed the precise question, the court should
defer to the agency's construction of the statute. Judge Bork concedes that
Chevron reviewed rulemaking.737 In his view, however, where adjudicative
authority has been delegated to an agency, it is even clearer that Chevron
should be followed. The explicit delegation to the agency "compels a court to
give deference to the agency's conclusions even on 'pure' questions of law
730. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 (1978).
731. BARTLT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 519 (16th ed. 1992).
732. Id. See also Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996) (deferring to agency interpretation despite
contrary Second Circuit precedent on matter).
733. See THE FEDERALST No. 48 (James Madison).
734. Pfaff v. United States Dep't of HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 747 (9th Cir. 1996).
735. See National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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within that domain." ' The court's conclusion is "that Chevron has implicitly
modified earlier cases that adhered to the traditional rule of withholding defer-
ence on questions of contract interpretation" 9 - as well as other questions
of interpretation, whether in rules or decisions.
The Supreme Court has applied Chevron to an NLRB decision that an
employer had committed unfair labor practices.7 ' Chevron deference was
given to a Board determination that the statutory term "employee" covers those
who work for an employer while a union simultaneously pays them to organize
that employer.74' Chevron, said the Court, gives "the Board... a degree of
legal leeway when it interprets its governing statute."742 Since, in such a case,
Congress "intended an understanding of labor relations to guide the Act's appli-
cation," the Board's interpretation "will be upheld if 'reasonably defensi-
ble. 74
3
Pure Law and Jurisdiction
Marshall Breger has summarized my attitude toward Chevron: "Schwartz
suggests that Chevron blurs the distinction between law and fact upon which
the scope of review had been grounded. He believes that Chevron errs by dras-
tically limiting review, not only of agency findings of fact, but also of agency
construction of statutory law."744
The Supreme Court has indicated that Chevron does, indeed, go that far. A
1987 case confirms Judge Bork's view that Chevron does apply to "a pure
question of statutory construction," where the agency must be "accorded...
deference.., as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the
statute."745 This means that Chevron deference must be applied to "a pure
question of statutory construction," as well as to "the application of a
standar[d] ... to a particular set of facts.""'7 Yet statutory construction is a
matter that, under the traditional theory of Anglo-American judicial review, is
more legal than factual in nature, and hence for the courts to decide on judicial
review.747
The cases, however, go further than applying Chevron to "pure questions"
of statutory construction. In recent administrative law, the jurisdictional-fact
doctrine of Crowell v. Benson7t " has also given way to Chevron. The defer-
738. Id. at 1569-70.
739. Id. at 1570.
740. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. CL 450 (1995).
741. See id. at 452.
742. Id. at 453.
743. Id. In this case, however, "the Board needs very little legal leeway ... to convince us of the correct-
ness of its decision," id. - i.e., the agency interpretation was not only reasonable, but right.
744. Marshall Breger, Comments on Bernard Schwartz' Essay, 5 ADMIN. LJ. 347, 371 (1991).
745. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987).
746. Id. See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 3 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
747. For state cases so holding, see Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenae Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896
(Alaska 1987); Massey v. Board of Trustees, 500 So. 2d 864 (La. Ct. App. 1986); In re Gruber, 674 N.E.2d
1354 (N.Y. 1996).
748. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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ence required by Chevron may reach agency extensions of their own jurisdic-
tion, because agency power to act may depend on findings involving statutory
interpretation. As a state court put it, "many, if not most, statutory interpretation
issues arising in administrative proceedings could be phrased in terms of the
agency's 'authority,' 'power' or 'jurisdiction' to take a certain type of action in
a specific case."749
As the D.C. Circuit points out, the Supreme Court has never directly ruled
on the matter of deference on jurisdictional issues. The D.C. circuit itself, how-
ever, decided explicitly in favor of Chevron deference on such an issue in Okla-
homa Natural Gas Co. v FERC.75° In rejecting the argument that Chevron def-
erence should not govern review of a finding that a federal agency's exercise of
power preempted state power, the D.C. Circuit pointed out that, except for
negative exercises of federal authority, all legal interpretations by federal agen-
cies have some preemptive effect, because no state law in direct contradiction
will survive.!" Hence, "[pletitioner's special non-deference principle would
therefore have to be applied almost universally, overturning Chevron."752 Con-
sequently, the court concluded "we review FERC's interpretation of its authori-
ty to exercise jurisdiction over transportation with the familiar Chevron frame-
work in mind."75 3 The Fourth Circuit has also rejected the argument that
Chevron deference should not be applied to an agency's "construction of a
jurisdictional rather than a purely administrative ... issue. '754
Though, as stated, the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the rela-
tionship between Chevron and jurisdiction, individual Justices have indicated
their agreement with the D.C. and Fourth Circuits. In a 1990 case, respondents
had argued that Chevron should not apply because the agency regulations deter-
mined the scope of its jurisdiction.' The Court did not deal with this argu-
ment, but a dissent by Justice White stated that the Court had never accepted it
and "there are good reasons not to accept it."75  According to White, under
Chevron, the cases "have deferred to agencies' determinations of matters that
affect their own statutory jurisdiction.... The application of Chevron principles
cannot be avoided on this basis."7s
Justice Scalia has also gone out of his way to state that "the rule of defer-
ence applies even to an agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority or
jurisdiction." ' A Scalia letter indicates that he had first intended to dissent in
the case on the ground that the "FERC [the agency involved] did not have
749. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Mass Transit Admin., 449 A.2d 385, 389 (Md. 1982).
750. 28 F.3d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
751. See id. at 1284.
752. Id.
753. Id.
754. Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Barnard, 933 F.2d 256, 258 n.5 (4th Cir. 1991).
755. See Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 54 (1990) (White, J., dissenting).
756. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
757. Id at 54-55 (White, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction to consider the MP&L prudency issue""7 9 - i.e., the issue in the
case. Consideration of the matter, however, led the Justice to conclude that
Chevron made his proposed dissent "untenable. Or at least untenable given my
views on deference to administrative interpretations of statutes."' t
Instead, Justice Scalia issued a concurrence that stated flatly that Chevron
deference applies in such a case. To Scalia, such deference application is both
necessary and appropriate.
It is necessary because there is no discernible line between an agency's
exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application
of its authority. To exceed authorized application is to exceed authority.
Virtually any administrative action can be characterized as either the one
or the other, depending upon how generally one wishes to describe the
'authority. '"761
Such an argument, however, is two-edged. If exceeding authority can be in-
volved in "virtually any" Chevron deference, it may militate against Chevron
itself in a system that had its origin in the jurisdictional basis of judicial review.
Justice Scalia also asserted that "deference is appropriate because it is
consistent with the general rationale for deference: Congress would naturally
expect that the agency would be responsible, within broad limits, for resolving
ambiguities in its statutory authority or jurisdiction. 762 One may, however,
doubt that Congress did have the intention stated by Scalia. Agencies have no
special expertise in deciding their own jurisdiction. In addition, statutory provi-
sions confining an agency's authority manifest an unwillingness to give the
agency freedom to define the scope of its own power. To give effect to the
confining intent, the ultimate word on jurisdiction should be with courts, not
agencies.
The need for judicial control here has been pointedly stated by Cass R.
Sunstein:
A cardinal principle of American constitutionalism is that those who are
limited by law should not be empowered to decide on the meaning of the
limitation: foxes should not guard henhouses. The Chevron rule disregards
this principle by permitting agencies to interpret laws that limit and con-
trol their authority. The need for an independent judicial arbiter is espe-
cially urgent here.... 76 s
A more recent observer goes even further, asserting, "The Justices in recent
years have compromised the rule of law in the administrative state, perhaps
most profoundly, by their commitment to the Chevron approach to reviewing
agency interpretations of their governing statutes." '76
759. Letter from Justice Scalia to Justice Brennan (May 23, 1988) (available from the Thurgood Marshall
Papers, Library of Congress).
760. ld.
761. Mississippi Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring).
762. Id. at 381-82 (Scalia, J., concurring).
763. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 224 (1990).
764. Werham, supra note 641, at 464.
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Chevron Ad Absurdum
Rust v. Sullivan7' illustrates how Chevron may skew the result in what
would have once been a simple administrative law case. At issue were Depart-
ment of HHS regulations prohibiting federally funded projects from engaging in
counseling concerning, referrals for, or active advocacy of abortion. The statute
specified that none of the federal funds appropriated for family planning servic-
es "shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family plan-
ning." ' Doctors argued that this provision did not authorize the Secretary to
interfere with their First Amendment right to counsel their patients by prohibit-
ing them from giving abortion information and advice.76
There has been controversy over Rust's holding that the regulations did not
violate plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. However, the foundation of the Rust
decision was Chevron. Chief Justice Rehnquist starts by finding the statutory
language "ambiguous."7  In such a case, under Chevron, "substantial defer-
ence is accorded to the interpretation of the authorizing statute by the agency
authorized with administering it." '769 As interpreted by Rust, this means that
"[t]he Secretary's construction... may not be disturbed as an abuse of discre-
tion if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the statute and
does not otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent."" In Rust, the
Secretary's construction came within this test; hence, "we must defer to the
Secretary's permissible construction of the statute.""'
The Rust opinion states that Chevron deference requires the agency inter-
pretation to be upheld "if it reflects a plausible construction of... the stat-
ute.' "m Until Rust, it had been assumed that "the Chevron yardstick [was]
'reasonableness." ' m In Justice Scalia's words, Chevron requires the courts to
"give effect to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute." 4 Rust trans-
forms the reasonableness requirement to one of plausibility - a test met by an
interpretation that has only an appearance or show of truth"5 - i.e., it is only
superficially fair or reasonable" 6 Rust makes for a dilution in scope of review
even beyond that made by Chevron itself.
More and more, Chevron is resulting in deference to agency decisions in
cases involving legal questions that, not long ago, would have been held to be
categorically for the courts. Ambiguity in a statute should not be enough to
compel the courts to yield to merely "plausible" agency interpretation. "An
765. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
766. Id. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1994)).
767. See id. at 192.
768. Id. at 184.
769. Id.
770. Id.
771. Id. at 187.
772. Id. at 184.
773. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
774. Scalia, supra note 465, at 512 n.6.
775. See 11 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICIONARY 1011 (2d ed. 1951).
776. See WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1886 (2d ed. 1951).
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ambiguity is not a delegation of law-interpreting power. Chevron elides the
two. 7
7n
Ben Avon and Fundamental Rights
Miller v. Johnsonrn was one of the Supreme Court's most noted recent
decisions, for it struck down a Congressional district where race was the pre-
dominant factor in its drawing. The district had been subject to preclearance
under the Voting Rights Act and had received Justice Department
preclearance, It was argued that the preclearance was based upon a determi-
nation that there was a compelling interest to support the racial districting and
that the Department's determination was entitled to deference.78 The argu-
ment was rejected. The judiciary, said the Court, retains an independent obliga-
tion to decide in such a case whether the challenged action is narrowly tailored
to support a compelling interest.: To defer to the Department "would be sur-
rendering to the Executive Branch our role in enforcing the constitutional limits
on race-based official action."' Though the Court has deferred to the
Department's interpretation where only the meaning of statutes is involved, "we
have rejected agency interpretations to which we would otherwise defer where
they raise serious constitutional questions."7 3
Is it fanciful to treat the Court's approach as a present-day version of the
supposedly defunct Ben Avon doctrine?8 4 There may still be full review of
agency determinations upon which personal rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion depend - such as First Amendment rights"s or, under Miller, where it is
claimed that voting rights are subjected to equal-protection abridgements. In
such a case, Miller affirms, it is for the courts, not the Executive, "to say what.
the law is."'7'e
Perhaps the most important expansion in the scope of review has occurred
under the California "fundamental rights" doctrine.7 The California doctrine
has been explained by a member of its highest court. He starts by recognizing
that the normal rule governing scope of review in our administrative law "is the
substantial evidence rule where the judiciary defers to the factual decisions of
the administrators and upholds them unless the findings are unsupported by
substantial evidence in the light of the whole record."8 In certain cases, how-
ever, California "applies a unique rule where the trial court exercises its inde-
777. SUNSTEN, supra note 763, at 143.
778. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
779. See id. at 2485.
780. See id. at 2481.
781. See id. at 2491.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
785. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, § 10.24.
786. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
787. See SCHWARIZ, supra note 91, § 10.24.
788. County of Alameda v. Carnes, 760 P.2d 464, 469 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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pendent judgment, reweighing the evidence and making its own factual determi-
nations."" The California scope of review depends upon the right affected by
the administrative action. "If 'the right has been acquired by the individual and
if the right is fundamental, the courts have held the loss of it is sufficiently vital
to the individual to compel a full and independent review."' 7  Under indepen-
dent judgment review, the reviewing court does not defer to the agency or the
ALJ even on the credibility of witnesses.""
There has been a steady expansion in the class of rights coming within
California independent-judgment review. Earlier cases focused on the
"vestedness" of the rights involved. More recently, the emphasis has changed to
"fundamentalness." Under the cases, a right need not be a constitutional right to
be considered fundamental. Thus, the California courts have applied the doc-
trine of independent review to decisions involving Medicaid applications,7"
disability benefits,7" motor vehicle licenses,79 tavern permits,79 and age
discrimination complaints.796
The crucial element is the importance of the given right to the individual
concerned; the effect of the agency decision on the individual is the key factor.
Thus, though the California fundamental rights doctrine may have originally
been Ben Avon in another form,7' it has become much broader, since Ben
Avon was confined to constitutional rights. The California doctrine has been
criticized,79 but the courts have continued, not only to apply, but to extend it
to nonconstitutional rights, making it virtually as broad as the concept of
"entitlements" enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court.799 Underlying the Cali-
fornia doctrine are the factors stated by the judge already quoted:
The practical concerns are that the bureaucracy established to advance
valid governmental policy decisions will in carrying out those legislative
determinations run roughshod over the individual's fundamental vested
rights.... [The judiciary because of its independence and long tenure,
probably can exert a more enduring and equitable influence in safeguard-
ing fundamental ... rights than the other two branches of government
which remain subject to the will of a contemporary and fluid majority."
789. Id.
790. Id. at 472.
791. See Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agen-
cies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1168 (1995).
792. See Cooper v. Kizer, 282 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
793. See Frink v. Prod, 643 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1982).
794. See Berlinghieri v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 657 P.2d 383 (Cal. 1983).
795. See Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
796. See Kerrigan v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 154 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. CL. App. 1979). For
seemingly inconsistent cases, see Asimow, supra note 791, at 1175-76. For a recent independent judgment
review case, see Glenn v. City of Inglewood, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
797. See Woodard v. Personnel Comm'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
798. See Asimow, supra note 791, at 1176-92.
799. This concept started with the decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
800. County of Alameda v. Carnes, 760 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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When the right at stake is deemed fundamental, full review is appropriate be-
cause "abrogation of the right is too important to the individual to relegate to
exclusive administrative extinction." 801
CONCLUSION
The decade under review began with the end of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
first term in the Supreme Court's center chair and ended with abolition of the
archetype independent agency,"e as well as the fiftieth anniversary of the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act and a new California APA. °3 The Federal
APA marked the beginning of a new era in administrative law, just as the abo-
lition of the Interstate Commerce Commission marked the end of one. In fact,
we can now say (as Judge Bazelon once did), "We stand on the threshold of a
new era in the history of ... administrative [law].""
Certainly, the termination of the ICC signals a new stage in administrative
organization and operation. It shows that the administrative law version of
General MacArthur's "barracks ballad" about "old soldiers" '' is not always
accurate: old agencies can die, if there is the legislative will to do away with
them when they no longer serve a useful purpose."°a More important, the ICC
abolition has tilted the balance away from the independent regulatory commis-
sion. Not long ago, administrative law dealt with agencies exercising powers of
economic regulation, particularly the so-called "big seven" - the seven major
independent regulatory organs in the Federal Government.8" Three of them
are now gone," 8 and their functions have been transferred to executive de-
partments.
More than ever, the administrative law emphasis has shifted from econom-
ic regulation to social regulation and social welfare. Agencies such as the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, OSHA, and the Social Security Administration
now dwarf the traditional FTC-type independent regulatory agencies. The
changing balance is illustrated by the number of AUL's in the different agencies:
1,092 in the Social Security Administration alone, as against 75 in the tradition-
al independent regulatory agencies (FCC, FTC, NLRB, and SEC)."°
801. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 520 P.2d 29, 33 (Cal. 1974).
802. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, § 101, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
803. See CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 11400 (West 1994); Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act on California's New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA LJ. 297 (1996).
804. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
805. "[O]ld soldiers never die; they just fade away." BARTLETT'S FAiLIAR QUOTATIONS 642 (16th ed.
1992).
806. However, as is often the case with administrative law "reforms," the ICC has been replaced by the
Surface Transportation Board, an independent agency in the Department of Transportation, which is not only
to perform the ICC's functions, but is to be composed, first of all, of members of the ICC serving the remain-
der of their unexpired terms. See ICC Termination Act § 201-203.
807. The seven include CAB, FCC, FPC, FFC, ICC, NLRB, and SEC. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ &
H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GovERNMENT 28 (1972).
808. Those are CAB, FPC, and ICC.
809. See Schwartz, supra note 286, at 213.
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The fact that the decade under review has been the first decade of the
Rehnquist Court has also had significant administrative law effects. The
Rehnquist Court has been the most pro-agency Court since the New Deal Jus-
tices who, starting in 1937, so transformed our public law. The years since
those Justices sat have seen a major shift in the attitude, both of the courts and
the country, toward agency power.
In the 1930s and 1940s the administrative process was seen as the great
hope in the governmental system. Its proponents hoped that it would effect a
progressive modification of the economy and society, comparable at the least to
the great English reform movement of a century earlier. Many went even fur-
ther and saw in administration the ultimate supplanter of private industry which
would take over the role of economic leadership in the public interest. This was
the shining ideal that enthralled the extreme New Dealer. This was the horrid
specter that terrified private industry. We now know that neither the thrill nor
the chill has been justified by the reality."'
In recent years, there has been a growing malaise that has replaced the
perhaps unwarranted optimism of half a century ago. More and more, adminis-
trative lawyers have been voicing doubts about the ability of their administra-
tive law to meet the basic needs of the society that called it forth. The courts,
too, became increasingly disenchanted with the claims of administrative exper-
tise. This was reflected in the Burger Court's stricter interpretation of agency
enabling statutes,' as well as the "hard look" doctrine" 2 that made for a
more searching inquiry into the merits of challenged administrative action.
The "hard look" doctrine, Judge Higginbotham tells us, was part of the
"move[ment] to make the administrative process more accountable and respon-
sive." Now, however, Higginbotham has asserted, the courts have all but "aban-
doned the hard-look doctrine. Instead, [they have] begun to fashion what can
only be called the 'quick-glance doctrine."'' '
If such a development has occurred, it has in large part been the handi-
work of the Rehnquist Court. The cases discussed in this article - particularly
Mistretta,"4  Loving,"5  Franklin,8 16 Dalton,817  Catholic Social Servic-
es,818 and, most of all, Chevron and its progeny '9 - have been reversions
toward the past that threaten to undo a half century's progress in administrative
law. They exalt executive and administrative power and eliminate important
legislative and judicial controls. Above all, what the Rehnquist Court has been
810. Compare Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1107 (1954).
811. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law and the Burger Court, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 325, 333
(1980).
812. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
813. Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1359 (3d Cir. 1993).
814. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
815. See supra notes 100-01, 107-18 and accompanying text.
816. See supra notes 542-55 and accompanying text.
817. See supra notes 556-66 and accompanying text.
818. See supra notes 670-86 and accompanying text.
819. See supra notes 701-77 and accompanying text.
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doing "in its holding[s] is effectively to have courts take a back seat to bureau-
cratic agencies in protecting constitutional liberties."'82 Unless the Rehnquist
trend is reversed by future Courts, the consequences for administrative law
could be most unfortunate.
820. See Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1359 (3d Cir. 1993).
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